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 Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science 
in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as 
a Test Case for Reform Strategies 
ANDREW JURS 
Since Daubert, courts have faced difficulty with screening cutting-edge 
scientific evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  By 
inconsistently handling particularly complex epidemiologic studies in 
Daubert reviews, judges analyzing this science exposed weaknesses of the 
Daubert system.  Weaknesses of the Daubert regime include judicial skills 
with scientific methods, use of improper bright-line tests, outlier 
enhancement of experts, and the incompatibility of some judicial procedure 
with science.  Each identified issue presents a reason why a judge may 
inaccurately evaluate scientific principles. 
To address these identified weaknesses, this Article proposes 
modifications to the current system.  One way to bring more science back 
into the courthouse, or to the judge’s chambers, is to permit the 
appointment of a science consultant under a modified Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706.  For an even smaller subset of more complex cases, 
advanced science procedures will be needed.  A science panel approach, 
using a modified arbitration panel format, or a centralized court of 
scientific jurisdiction would have advantages over the current system. 
By critically examining the breakdown of Daubert in the face of 
epidemiologic risk evidence, evaluating the nature of the weaknesses in the 
system, and creating reforms structured to respond to those concerns, we 
can modify the current Daubert system to allow judges to more 
consistently, accurately and efficiently handle the most complex, cutting-
edge science presented in litigation. 
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Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science 
in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as 
a Test Case for Reform Strategies 
ANDREW JURS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In our American legal system, lawyers address controversies by 
reducing them to their essential elements, presenting them in a courtroom, 
and resolving them through the application of standard legal principles.  
Certainly this ideal works well enough for wide varieties of cases—
criminal charges, a typical car crash, or contract disputes—subject to 
decision making within the general parameters of the courtroom with the 
application of general principles of law.  Highly complex cases with 
disputed questions of scientific fact, however, cast doubt on the general 
principle. 
Many commentators see science and the law as inherently 
incompatible, particularly with the most cutting-edge or complex science.  
Some highlight the distinction between the two methods of decision 
making: science finds truth through experiments and testing while law 
relies on rhetorical argument.1  Another commentator states that the 
fundamental distinction is the handling of uncertainty: science recognizes 
uncertainty and acknowledges it, law results in clear decisions out of 
uncertain principles.2  A third commentator states that the problem lies in 
the way judges review particularly complex science (e.g., toxicity 
evidence): scientists rely on all data available while judges rely on single 
sources to their detriment.3 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, 2009–present; Visiting Assistant 
Professor of Law, Wake Forest University, 2008–2009.  J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 
School of Law (Boalt Hall); B.A., Stanford University.  The author wishes to thank Michael D. Green, 
Sidney Shapiro, Ronald Wright, Dick Schneider, Kami Simmons, Scott Shepard, and Joseph Sanders 
for their comments on earlier versions of this work.  Thanks also to Katie, Clara, and Milo, without 
whom this paper would not have been possible. 
1 Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need 
for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 327, 
333. 
2 Sander Greenland, The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and 
Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2004) [hereinafter Greenland, Critical Appraisal].  
Some courts explicitly recognize this inherent limitation in the judicial versus scientific methods as 
well.  See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 97 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (D. Mass. 2000). 
3 David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert 
Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 475–76 (2008). 
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If science and the law are fundamentally incompatible, as these 
scientists suggest, then what framework is appropriate for judicial review 
of difficult scientific principles? 
Pursuant to the Daubert decision and Federal Rule of Evidence 702,4 
judges screen scientific expert testimony prior to presentation at trial.5  The 
screening process exists to ensure evidentiary reliability and relevance so 
that only appropriate science is admitted at trial.  In Daubert, the United 
States Supreme Court plainly stated, and therefore assumed, that judges 
would be able to make detailed determinations on all complex and cutting-
edge scientific principles.6  The Court had no data or studies to prove this 
assumption true, yet made it with the confidence that the proposition was 
unquestionable. 
Since Daubert in 1993, contradictory case law in the area of 
epidemiologic risk assessment—a specialized area including highly 
complex and cutting-edge science—has cast doubt on the Daubert 
assumption of unquestioned judicial skill in expert testimony review.  Case 
law in the area has been highly contradictory, and savagely critiqued by 
scientific reviewers.7  Some courts have directly reversed course, requiring 
certain evidentiary underpinnings initially and then changing course in 
more recent cases.8  Meanwhile, fundamental assumptions contained 
within the scientific data have been unrecognized or ignored.  All of these 
factors from the epidemiologic risk controversy enhance uncertainty for 
litigants in future cases. 
By examining and analyzing the cases, commentary, and theories 
surrounding the epidemiologic risk controversy, this Article first examines 
the weaknesses of the judicial handling of difficult scientific evidence 
under Daubert.  By enumerating these weaknesses, one can begin to 
suggest reforms to address the problems in judicial evaluation of complex 
science.  Systematic reforms allow judges the necessary tools to make 
appropriate Daubert determinations on the most cutting-edge or complex 
scientific controversies, such as the evidence from cases involving 
epidemiologic risk assessment.  With these new procedural reforms in 
                                                                                                                          
4 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
6 Id. at 592–93. 
7 See infra Parts II.B.–D. 
8 See id. 
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place, courts can avoid the common problems with the evaluation of 
complex science under Daubert, and overcome the supposed 
incompatibility of the scientific and legal methodologies. 
By reviewing the epidemiologic risk assessment case law and 
commentary, evaluating the weaknesses of judicial evaluation of complex 
science in the courtroom, and suggesting reform, this Article contends that 
judicial officers can more accurately, efficiently, and consistently handle 
controversies involving difficult scientific evidence. 
II.  EPIDEMIOLOGIC RISK ASSESSMENT IN TOXIC 
TORT/PHARMACEUTICAL CASES 
Epidemiology is a highly complex area of scientific inquiry, discussed 
in a large number of detailed toxic tort case decisions.  Judges evaluating 
epidemiologic evidence for admissibility must use the Daubert test from 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for determining relevance and reliability. 
To determine the difficulties with the judicial handling of 
epidemiologic risk, this section first briefly examines the general principles 
of the Daubert system and then examines how those principles have been 
applied in the epidemiologic risk case law.  After reviewing the 
inconsistent case law on this topic, this section analyzes additional grounds 
that explain why epidemiologic risk case law provides a good example of 
difficult science in the courts. 
A.  Daubert Background 
Judicial recognition of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as the mechanism 
for admission of expert testimony occurred in Daubert, almost twenty 
years after the initial adoption of Rule 702.9  In doing so, the ancien regimé 
of Frye10 had been overthrown, replaced by judicial gatekeeping with a 
new two-pronged approach for judicial evaluation of science. 
Frye required that proponents of scientific techniques prove that the 
techniques had gained general acceptance within the appropriate scientific 
community prior to admission in court.11  During the last decade of the 
Frye regime, courts adopted a patchwork of rules whereby the Frye 
analysis would be applied for some testimony, while a Rule 702 approach 
would be applied to other cases, with the distinction being between those 
cases based on well-established theories and those employing new or novel 
science.12 
                                                                                                                          
9 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 589, 597. 
10 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
11 Id. at 1014. 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the argument 
presented at the trial court level as to whether the science was “new” and therefore a mandated 
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In contrast to the pre-1993 confusion with Frye and Rule 702 
coexisting for different types of evidence, the universal Daubert standard 
promised an era of simplicity and efficient analysis of scientific expert 
testimony.  To replace the general acceptance standard under Frye, the 
Daubert Court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 required a two-
pronged approach: judges would evaluate the reliability of the proposed 
testimony and then determine if it was relevant to the case.13  Reliability is 
the measure of the scientific worthiness of the evidence, measured by 
multiple factors, including methodology, publication and peer review, 
known rate of error, and standards and controls, as well as the general 
acceptance.14  Relevance measures the “fit” of the testimony to the 
controversy of the case.15 
To make admissibility determinations on scientific evidence under 
Rule 702, judges should apply the Daubert/702 standard to the proffered 
testimony and decide if admissibility has been established.  Dismissive of 
the difficulty of applying the test to some scientific principles, the Daubert 
Court stated plainly:  “We are confident that federal judges possess the 
capacity to undertake this review.”16 
In the case of highly complex or cutting-edge science, judges 
recognized immediately the burden placed upon them to make difficult 
decisions.17  In the case of epidemiologic risk case law, judicial opinions 
both recognize this difficulty and display the problem with the approach. 
B.  Epidemiology After Daubert: Daubert II and the Doubling-of-the-Risk 
Approach 
On remand in Daubert II, the Ninth Circuit faced review of the 
epidemiologic evidence under the new standards for judicial review of 
scientific evidence.18  The panel commented on its review capability, 
stating that “judges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific 
testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert 
world than before.”19  Acknowledging that the judges may not be qualified 
                                                                                                                          
application of Frye); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1132–34 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(debating whether only Frye applies only to novel techniques, or whether there should be a Rule 702 
reliability analysis as well, and noting split in circuits on Frye applicability); United States v. Hadley, 
918 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting party’s claims that Frye’s novel evidence theory should 
have applied rather than standard Rule 702 analysis); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203–
04 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying general acceptance test of Frye, but noting a circuit split on the issue). 
13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 
14 Id. at 593–94. 
15 Id. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 Id. at 593. 
17 See discussion infra Part II.B. and text accompanying notes 19–21. 
18 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). 
19 Id. 
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to do so, the panel described the process as “uncomfortable” and 
“daunting.”20  All of this difficulty resulted in the panel deciding to “take a 
deep breath and proceed with this heady task.”21 
The Daubert case on remand was heady indeed, although perhaps not 
in the same way the Ninth Circuit intended.  While the judicial evaluation 
of complex science would be difficult, uncomfortable, or daunting in many 
cases involving science, the Daubert II panel faced a highly complex toxic 
tort case involving detailed epidemiologic studies with a battle of experts.22 
In evaluating the epidemiologic evidence in the case, the court 
recognized that the relative risk ratio would be a critical issue in evaluation 
of the “fit” of the science to the controversy over Bendectin exposure.23  
Relative risk is the ratio of the incidence rate of disease in the exposed 
group as compared to an unexposed control group.24  In the Daubert case 
the plaintiffs’ experts stated that Bendectin exposure in utero resulted in a 
statistically significant relative risk of birth defects that was less than 
two.25  Plaintiffs presented this evidence to prove the causation element of 
their tort claim. 
In deciding whether the plaintiffs had met their burden, the court first 
determined that a relative risk “exceed[ing] 2” equals the “more likely than 
not” standard of preponderance of the evidence, since above two the 
chance of illness from the exposure exceeds the background chance of 
disease from all other causes.26  The court also stated that any relative risk 
of less than two tended to disprove causation.27  Because the plaintiffs’ 
experts concluded that the relative risk from Bendectin exposure was less 
than two, the court concluded the plaintiffs could only show that the 
exposure “could possibly have caused” the injuries.28  As a result, the court 
granted summary judgment to the defense.29 
Daubert II provided a high-profile and detailed precedent for other 
courts to follow in their own analyses of epidemiologic evidence.  Many 
                                                                                                                          
20 Id. at 1315–16. 
21 Id. at 1316. 
22 Id. at 1313–14, 1319. 
23 Id. at 1320–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 348 (2d ed. 2000). 
25 Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320–21.  The highest relative risk values for Bendectin and limb 
reduction birth defects stated in Daubert II were 1.6–1.7.  Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary 
Drawing and the Need for Content-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 37–38 (1996). 
26 Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 (quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 
(3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
27 Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321. 
28 Id. at 1322 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Ca. 
1989), aff’d, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 506 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
29 Id. 
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courts would adopt reasoning similar to Daubert II in handling their 
gatekeeping review of epidemiologic evidence. 
In one influential example, the U.S. District Court in Oregon addressed 
epidemiologic risk studies in the context of silicone breast implant 
litigation in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.30  In Hall, the court reviewed 
extensive epidemiologic studies that had concluded the relative risk for 
silicone gel breast implants and connective tissue disease was no higher 
than 1.24.31  The court then cited Daubert II regarding relative risk and the 
2.0 standard: “[f]or an epidemiological study to show causation under a 
preponderance standard, the relative risk of [the condition at issue] arising 
from the epidemiological data . . . will, at a minimum, have to exceed 
‘2’.”32  Since the epidemiologic studies in question demonstrated a relative 
risk no higher than 1.24, the court concluded that the studies would not 
support a conclusion that the plaintiff’s diseases were “more likely than 
not” caused by the silicone implants.33  The court even chastised the expert 
who attempted to testify regarding causation, stating that “[t]his is exactly 
the type of ‘junk science’ that the Supreme Court in Daubert I commanded 
courts to exclude.”34  As a result, the plaintiff’s injury claim for the silicone 
implants would not proceed, as “Daubert I and Daubert II and their 
progeny command this disposition.”35 
Similar analysis occurred outside the Ninth Circuit.36  In Allison v. 
McGhan Medical Corp., the Eleventh Circuit relied on both Daubert II and 
Hall in addressing epidemiologic evidence in a silicone breast implant 
case.37  The court noted that the epidemiologic data regarding silicone 
breast implants and connective tissue diseases showed a relative risk of no 
greater than 1.24, and then affirmed the trial court’s finding that the studies 
were inadequate to prove causation.38  As a result of this determination, 
and through analysis and rejection of other data on causation, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed summary judgment as granted by the district court.39  
Similar district court decisions requiring epidemiologic studies to reach a 
                                                                                                                          
30 Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392, 1404 (D. Or. 1996). 
31 Id. at 1404–05 & n.37. 
32 Id. at 1403 (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
33 Id. at 1405 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 Id. at 1405 n.39. 
35 Id. at 1415.  For a detailed analysis of the Hall case, see Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate 
to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort 
Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 352–56 (1999). 
36 For a detailed list of cases examining this issue, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 cmt. 
c(4), note (Proposed Final Draft 2005). 
37 Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999). 
38 Id. at 1315 n.16, 1316. 
39 Id. at 1321–22. 
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doubling-of-the-risk standard before being admitted occurred in diverse 
jurisdictions evaluating many different toxicity claims.40 
Doubling-of-the-risk methodology for review of epidemiologic 
evidence developed shortly after Daubert, and provided defendants a 
powerful argument for summary judgment in cases lacking relative risks 
over 2.0. 
C.  Scientific Commentary on the Doubling-of-the-Risk Controversy 
While the doubling-of-the-risk standard was not universally applied,41 
epidemiologists quickly reacted to Daubert II and its progeny.  These 
commentators rejected the courts’ analyses of the epidemiologic evidence, 
pointing out potential errors in these case opinions. 
Much of the criticism involved the doubling-of-the-risk standard 
failing to represent what the courts thought it represented.  The perception 
of a bright-line rule in the doubling-of-the-risk standard relied heavily on 
assumptions regarding other factors used by epidemiologists, assumptions 
about the use of population level statistics with specific plaintiffs, and 
policy choices unrelated to science.  Each criticism must be addressed 
separately. 
Doubling-of-the-risk methodology does have the potential to address 
the probability of injury, but only under extremely limited circumstances 
without additional complicating factors.  In the example of birth defects 
and medication, as seen in Daubert II, the risk assessment works so long as 
all women respond identically to the medicine, and the toxic agent has no 
                                                                                                                          
40 Regarding breast implants, see, e.g., Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 
92CV0314LEKRWS, 2001 WL 967608, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2001) (citing In re Breast Implant 
Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 1998)); Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 
992 (D. Ariz. 2000) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d 1300); Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995); In 
re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321; Hall, 947 F. Supp. 
at 1398). 
Regarding pharmaceutical cases, see, e.g., Kelley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 68 Fed. Cl. 
84, 92 (2005) (quoting Kelley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-223V, 2005 WL 1125671, at 
*5 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 17, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 68 Fed. Cl. 84 (2005)) (explaining that 
epidemiology must show relative risk greater than two to provide evidence of causation); Burton v. 
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 513 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. 
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717–18 (Tex. 1997)); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 355 B.R. 462, 483 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006) (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320). 
Regarding other substances, see, e.g., Cotroneo v. Shaw Envtl. & Infrastructure, Inc., No. H-05-
1250, 2007 WL 3145791, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717) 
(discussing radioactive material); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1004 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320–22) (discussing perfume and cologne). 
This is not merely a federal court phenomenon.  See, e.g., Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717 (citing 
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321) (finding the doubling-of-the-risk requirement persuasive).  Havner does 
hedge on the point, however, noting that this will not be considered a litmus test.  Id. at 718. 
41 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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effect on other causes of the disease.42  The methodology fails to recognize 
the differentiation between individuals with higher or lower overall 
exposure.43  It fails to recognize the difficulties caused by a particular 
individual’s sensitivity to the toxic agent.44  Another factor that 
complicates the extrapolation of relative risk ratio to causation involves the 
complication of scientific assessment because of late-occurring disease, 
following the initial outbreak or study.45  Finally, and by no means 
exhaustively, epidemiologists noted that confusion among definitions of 
which cases of disease were to be included in mathematical modeling also 
affected risk calculations.46 
As a result of these complicating factors escaping the judicial opinions, 
use of doubling-of-the-risk methodology provides a false sense of pure 
objective analysis lacking subjective input resulting from additional factor 
assessment.47 
Another major criticism leveled against the doubling-of-the-risk 
assessment is that while it may be helpful in the determination of 
population-level risks, it fails as a useful tool in evaluating the risks to any 
particular plaintiff.  Relative risk is the incidence ratio of an exposed 
population to the disease in an unexposed but otherwise similar 
population.48  Professor of Epidemiology Sander Greenland notes plainly 
that “[a]ll epidemiologic measures (such as rate ratios and rate fractions) 
reflect only the net impact of exposure on a population.”49  Measures like 
relative risk therefore simply do not address the causation of disease in any 
specific person:  “Population-wide risk estimates simply do not address, 
and thus cannot be translated to, the probability of causation in any one 
individual.”50 
                                                                                                                          
42 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 353. 
43 Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 39–40. 
44 Id.; see also Sander Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and 
Doubling Dose: A Methodologic Error that Has Become a Social Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1166, 1168 (1999) [hereinafter Greenland, Methodologic Error]. 
45 Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater than Two in Proof of 
Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195, 207 (2001). 
46 Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1168 (noting that interchangeable use of 
terms such as etiologic fraction, attributable risk, and probability of causation often results in 
underestimations of the probability of causation). 
47 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 356. 
48 Green et al., supra note 24, at 348. 
49 Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1168 (emphasis added). 
50 Finley, supra note 35, at 352–58; see also Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 
1168 (discussing variations within a population); Joseph V. Rodricks & Susan H. Rieth, Toxicological 
Risk Assessment in the Courtroom: Are Available Methodologies Suitable for Evaluating Toxic Tort 
and Product Liability Claims?, 27 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 21, 24–25 (1998) (“A 
population risk can be said to apply to individuals in that population, but only if it is assumed that all 
individuals are identical in respect of those characteristics . . . that have been assumed in the estimation 
of risks.”). 
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Because relative risk fails to apply to individual-level disease, the use 
of the relative risk number as the sine qua non of toxic tort causation 
appears misguided as a scientific principle.51 
Finally, scientific commentary criticizes the doubling-of-the-risk case 
law as representing underlying policy choices rather than a pure science-
based limitation.  Epidemiologist Dr. Jan Beyea and his co-author criticize 
the doubling-of-the-risk standard as essentially raising the standard in 
science-related cases from a preponderance standard to a standard above 
beyond a reasonable doubt, partially due to unrealistic expectations by 
judges.52  Other critics suggest that the debate over epidemiologic evidence 
hides a deeper debate over policy choices including who should bear the 
risk of harm from toxic exposure, wealth-shifting through tort, and the 
judge and jury balance of power.53  At least one group even hypothesizes 
that the standard may exist to benefit the intransigence of industry and to 
close the courthouse door to plaintiffs.54  Others mention that while the 
standard may deter plaintiffs due to the high burden, the doubling-of-the-
risk standard also has the effect of removing desirable deterrence in the 
form of tort incentives for industry to develop safer products and perform 
detailed research on products.55  All of these effects can disproportionately 
                                                                                                                          
51 Finley, supra note 35, at 348.  Voluminous analysis discusses the doubling-of-the-risk standard, 
and general and specific causation.  See Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Responsibility, 
in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352, 366–70 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (reviewing the debate of courts 
and commentators on the 2.0 standard); Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 45, at 200–02 (reviewing 
disparate judicial handling of the 2.0 standard). 
Some see the 2.0 standard as not protective enough of the requirements of causation.  While 
discounting the use of relative risk itself as the sole method of determining causation, Freedman and 
Stark argue that proof of causation in a specific case, even starting with a relative risk of four, was 
“unconvincing.”  David A. Freedman & Phillip B. Stark, The Swine Flu Vaccine and Guillain-Barré 
Syndrome: A Case Study in Relative Risk and Specific Causation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 61 
(2001) (citing Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1437 (W.D. Mo. 1986), aff’d in part, 830 
F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting a relative risk of 3.89–3.92)); see also Bert Black & David Lilienfeld, 
Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 769 (1984) (arguing evidence 
is insufficient to establish causal link without “data that reasonably indicate a relative risk greater than 
2”); Andrew W. Jurs, Daubert, Probabilities and Possibilities, and the Ohio Solution: A Sensible 
Approach to Relevance Under Rule 702 in Civil and Criminal Applications, 41 AKRON L. REV. 609, 
637 (2008) (considering effect on jury and noting less than 2.0 may be inviting speculation). 
52 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 358–59.  Beyea and Berger are not the sole authors to 
recognize this phenomenon.  See, e.g., Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 61. 
53 Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 61; see also Peter White, A Relative Risk 2.0: The Ninth Circuit 
Revisits Daubert’s Epidemiological Standard in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 13 S.E. 
ENVTL. L.J. 33, 65–66 (2004) (“Judges usurp the jury’s function when they effectively dismiss claims 
based on what typically are considered factual issues [such as the 2.0 standard in Daubert II].”). 
54 David Egilman et al., Proving Causation: The Use and Abuse of Medical and Scientific 
Evidence Inside the Courtroom—An Epidemilogist’s Critique of the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Daubert Ruling, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 223, 231 (2003). 
55 Finley, supra note 35, at 363–73; see also Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking 
Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 38 (2001). 
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impact racial minorities or women, who have traditionally received less 
research focus.56 
All of these policy choices underlying the epidemiologic risk 
assessment debate involve important societal implications, but have less to 
do with the analysis of science methodologies and content, which were the 
intended focus of Daubert gatekeeping. 
Scientific reaction to Daubert II and other similar case analyses of 
epidemiologic risk assessment in toxic tort litigation addressed in detail the 
underlying assumptions of the 2.0 standard used by the courts, the 
limitations of relative risk in causation, and the other potentially 
conflicting issues getting caught in the debate over scientific admissibility. 
D.  Other Courts Reject the 2.0 Standard, Before, and After Daubert II 
While the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal adopted the 
doubling-of-the-risk standard after Daubert,57 other U.S. courts of appeals 
did not mandate a bright-line approach.  Several opinions before 2000 
rejected the Daubert II approach, and by 2002 the Ninth Circuit had an 
opportunity to re-evaluate its adherence to the doubling-of-the-risk 
standard. 
In the same year as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Daubert II, the 
Second Circuit addressed epidemiologic risk analysis in In re Joint Eastern 
& Southern District Asbestos Litigation.58  In this case, the district court 
excluded certain epidemiologic studies as failing to establish a strong 
enough connection between the asbestos exposure and colon cancer.59  
While the district court noted that proof of causation could be established 
by studies showing a doubling-of-the-risk, or by studies with less than 
double the risk in addition to other evidence, the judge rejected studies 
under 2.0.60  On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court’s 
bright-line approach to the studies on the issue of risk ratio, stating the 
court was “reluctant to adopt such an approach.”61  Rather, the appellate 
court would hold the district court to the standard of its own 
pronouncements, allowing less than double the risk epidemiologic data 
along with other materials to suffice to prove causation.62  As a result, the 
court reversed the district court’s directed verdict on the issue of causation, 
                                                                                                                          
56 Finley, supra note 35, at 373–74. 
57 See supra notes 26, 37 and accompanying text. 
58 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995). 
59 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 52 F.3d 1127 (2d Cir. 1995). 
60 Id. 
61 In re Joint E. & S., 52 F.3d at 1134. 
62 See id. (stating a preference for the district court to instruct the jury on the science and then let 
the jury weigh the studies). 
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but in doing so also rejected the formalism of the recently issued Daubert 
II.63 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would first address 
epidemiologic risk while specifically addressing the doubling-of-the-risk 
methodology of Daubert II, in the decision in Ambrosini v. Labarraque.64  
The court specifically noted that the Ninth Circuit’s formulation for 
relative risk assessment requires an opinion that risk had more than 
doubled.65  However, the court rebuffed the Daubert II standard by stating 
that the epidemiologist’s testimony regarding birth defects and 
pharmaceuticals “does not warrant exclusion simply because it fails to 
establish the causal link to a specified degree of probability.”66  While the 
court conceded that the testimony itself may be insufficient to carry the 
burden of proof on causation, the evidence remained admissible because it 
might assist the jury in finding whether the chemical caused the injuries.67  
As a result, the court reiterated that the epidemiologist’s opinions on birth 
defects and pharmaceutical drugs were admissible under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.68  The Ambrosini decision openly questioned the Daubert II 
approach, and created a split in the U.S. courts of appeals’ approaches to 
epidemiologic risk analysis. 
In 1999, just as Daubert II’s doubling-of-the-risk analysis gained 
support with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Allison, the non-doubling 
approach would garner additional support after Ambrosini (and In re Joint 
Eastern & Southern).  The Third Circuit analyzed complex epidemiologic 
data regarding nuclear radiation exposure in In re TMI Litigation.69  In this 
case, scientific analysis evaluated the increased risk of cancer after the 
radiation exposure, and determined that an exposure of ten rems would 
equal the “doubling dose” for an exposed individual.70  At the district court 
level, Judge Rambo determined that the plaintiffs would have to show 
radiation exposure of ten rems to each plaintiff in order to succeed in 
establishing causation.71  As with the Ambrosini case, the court of appeals 
rejected the bright-line approach of the doubling dose requirements, and 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. at 1139.  In re Joint E. & S. does not mention Daubert II in the April 6, 1995, opinion, 
although Daubert II had been issued several months prior on January 4, 1995.  Id.; Daubert II, 43 F.3d 
1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). 
64 101 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
65 Id. at 135 n.8. 
66 Id. at 135. 
67 Id. at 136. 
68 Id. at 135–36. 
69 193 F.3d 613, 629 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000). 
70 See In re TMI Litig., 927 F. Supp. 834, 845, 864–66 (M.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 89 F.3d 1106 (3d 
Cir. 1996), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999), and amended by 199 F.3d 
158 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that a dose below ten rems is insufficient to infer more likely than not the 
existence of a causal link). 
71 In re TMI Litig., 927 F. Supp. at 866–67. 
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overturned the summary judgment granted against some plaintiffs.72  The 
In re TMI Litigation case established a break with prior Third Circuit 
precedent, particularly In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, which 
previously interpreted Daubert, along with the preponderance burden of 
proof, as requiring all expert opinions to rise to the level of probabilities.73 
The Third Circuit was not the sole U.S. appellate court reconsidering 
prior analysis on this issue.  In the decision issued in In re Hanford 
Nuclear Reservation Litigation, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed its 
analysis of relative risk from Daubert II and rejected the formalism of its 
prior approach.74  In the decision, the court assessed the Daubert II 
reasoning, but adopted the language of the Third Circuit from In re TMI 
Litigation:  “We agree with the Third Circuit that the validity of a claim 
should not depend on whether a plaintiff was exposed to a fraction of a rem 
lower than the ‘doubling dose.’”75  As a result, the court found error in the 
district court’s determination that the epidemiologic evidence would have 
to show a relative risk exceeding 2.0 to be admitted.76  Following In re 
Hanford, courts in the Ninth Circuit had a clear mandate to rethink the 
doubling-of-the-risk requirement of Daubert II.77 
Additional case law outside the Third and Ninth Circuits demonstrates 
similar trends.  In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado 
addressed epidemiologic evidence in the case of Cook v. Rockwell 
International Corp.78  The U.S. District Court in Colorado had in 1998 
adopted the Daubert II doubling-of-the-risk requirement on epidemiologic 
                                                                                                                          
72 In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 727.  The summary judgment order affected plaintiffs who had not 
proceeded to trial, as the “Trial Plaintiffs” had proceeded on a theory of the case that all had received at 
least that dose of exposure.  Id. 
73 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 751–52 (3d Cir. 1994).  In re Paoli does not 
appear to require a “doubling-of-the-risk” standard per se, and the case occurred before Daubert II so it 
does not address the Daubert II formulation.  See id. (requiring expert opinions to rise to a reasonable 
degree of certainty).  However, as most courts agree that doubling-of-the-risk equals the preponderance 
of the evidence standard, In re Paoli is consistent with the Daubert II decision.  Daubert II, 43 F.3d 
1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that to show preponderance, risk ratio must exceed 2.0); see also 
Green et al., supra note 24, at 384 (“The threshold for concluding that an agent was more likely than 
not the cause of an individual’s disease is a relative risk greater than 2.0.”). 
At least one district court decision in the Third Circuit, which cites both In re Paoli and In re TMI 
Litigation, affirmed that the doubling-of-the-risk standard would not be a “password to a finding of 
causation,” rejecting the “mere conclusion-oriented selection process.”  Magistrini v. One Hour 
Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 605 n.27, 606–07 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d 68 Fed. App’x 
356 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (N.J. 1992)). 
74 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2002).  The 
companion case to In re Hanford is In re Berg Litigation, decided on the same day and based on the 
same analysis as In re Hanford.  In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). 
75 In re Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1137. 
76 Id. 
77 For an example of a case decided in the same year but before In re Hanford, see Ferguson v. 
Riverside Sch. Dist. No. 416, No. CS-00-0097-FVS, 2002 WL 34355958 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2002). 
78 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088–89 (D. Colo. 2006). 
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evidence in the decision In re Breast Implant Litigation.79  In addressing 
the connection between radiation from the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons 
plant and cancer incidence, the Cook court determined that the Daubert II 
requirement for admissibility of epidemiologic evidence “confuses the 
threshold question of whether an expert’s evidence is admissible with the 
separate question of whether it is sufficient to prove a particular point.”80  
In so finding, the district court rejected its prior use of the Daubert II 
standard by adoption of the non-2.0 standard. 
This is not solely a federal phenomenon.  In In re Lockheed Litigation 
Cases,81 a California Court of Appeals addressed epidemiologic studies in 
a case involving chemical exposure in the workplace and disease 
incidence.82  Of note, the California court would use the standard of 
causation for California that is identical to the standard used for the 
Daubert II ruling.83  Even under the same standard of causation, the court 
in Lockheed rejected the imposition of the doubling-of-the-risk standard, 
noting:  “[A] court cannot exclude an epidemiological study from 
consideration solely because the study shows a relative risk of less than 
2.0.”84 
Appellate courts rejected a bright-line doubling-of-the-risk approach 
around the same time as Daubert II, in In re Joint Eastern & Southern 
Asbestos Litigation and Ambrosini.85  During the next seven years, the 
Third Circuit’s rejection of the In re Paoli analysis in In re TMI Litigation 
and the Ninth Circuit’s re-evaluation of epidemiologic standard in In re 
Hanford provided evidence of a profound switch in analysis.86 
The profound disagreement between the courts addressing 
epidemiologic risk evidence in the immediate aftermath of Daubert, and 
the later re-evaluation of the issues by some of those courts, indicate that 
                                                                                                                          
79 In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing Daubert II, 43 
F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or. 
1996)). 
80 Cook, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 n.8, 1084 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315).  The Cook court 
also cited papers by epidemiologists Sander Greenland and David Egilman et al., both of which address 
concerns on court use/misuse of epidemiology and statistics.  Id. at 1102–03; see also Greenland, 
Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 297–301; Egilman et al., supra note 54, at 236–41. 
81 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
82 Lockheed Litig., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.  The diseases alleged included brain, liver, and kidney 
damage.  Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2, Lockheed Litig., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(No. B166347), 2003 WL 23281037. 
83 Lockheed Litig., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 777 (citing Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320). 
84 Id. at 778. 
85 Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 135–36 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. 
Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995). 
86 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002); In re TMI 
Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 727 (3d Cir. 1999), amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Cook v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1083 n.8, 1084 (D. Colo. 2006) (adopting a reasonable 
certainty standard of causation). 
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judges have been either confused or inconsistent on complex 
epidemiologic evidence.  As a result, the doubling-of-the-risk controversy 
provides an outstanding example of judicial handling of complex science. 
E.  Why Is This a Good “Test Case” for Science in the Courtroom? 
Independent of the inconsistent handling of epidemiologic risk 
assessment by appellate circuits and district courts, several attributes of the 
relative risk controversy add to its usefulness as an example of complex or 
cutting-edge science in the courtroom.  These features include 
epidemiologic research as a field of scientific analysis involving significant 
complexity, epidemiology as a relatively young scientific discipline 
lacking consensus within the field on its use in torts, and epidemiologic 
proof as the sole method of proving causation for certain cases. 
1.  Epidemiology as a Scientific Field Containing Areas of Significant 
Complexity 
Epidemiology is a field of scientific research that contains areas of 
highly complex and specialized analysis.  As a result, some judicial 
interpretation of epidemiology using the Daubert analysis comes out of a 
desire to seek clarity from confusion.  But in doing so, the courts miss 
subtleties about the science that cast doubt on the proposition that judicial 
interpretations represent what the courts intend. 
Clearly the responsibility of a district court screening the most detailed 
and complex research in epidemiology is a difficult task.  The In re Joint 
Eastern & Southern court noted that sufficiency of proof in epidemiologic 
evidence cases “poses unique difficulties for trial courts.”87  The United 
States Supreme Court in Daubert had previously declared that judges 
would “possess the capacity to undertake” this difficult task, although the 
Ninth Circuit disagreed as well, calling the review of epidemiology in 
Daubert II “uncomfortable” and “daunting.”88 
The opinions of Judge Jones in Hall and Judge Sparr in In re Breast 
Implant Litigation demonstrate courts reviewing complex epidemiologic 
studies but focusing mostly on relative risk ratios.89  Each judge evaluated 
a series of epidemiologic studies, but then focused most of their attention 
on the relative risk number of 1.24 from a published study on breast 
                                                                                                                          
87 In re Joint E. & S., 52 F.3d at 1133. 
88 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 
1315–16 (9th Cir. 1995); see supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (summarizing Daubert 
decisions). 
89 In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221, 1225–29 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1391, 1403–05 (D. Or. 1996). 
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implant illnesses.90  In these cases, judges missed or rejected analysis of 
complicating factors in the field which lessen the overall importance of 
relative risk ratios in declaring cause for an individual plaintiff.91 
Epidemiology is the science of evaluating whether a particular 
exposure caused a particular disease.92  Relative risk is one indicator 
epidemiologists may use in their evaluation of causation, but alone it 
serves only to show an association rather than cause.93  To go from 
association to a causal connection, an epidemiologist analyzes multiple 
other factors in testing the validity of association.94  Only after a detailed 
analysis of all factors may the expert form a final conclusion about whether 
the causative effect has been proven.95 
As a highly complex science, judges untrained in science, and the 
lawyers in their courtrooms, will be less skillful in the field than 
practitioners.  Granting judicial oversight authority on science must come 
with the recognition that judges may be ill-suited to the task.96  
Epidemiology provides one dramatic example of the difficulties judges 
have with complex science in the courtroom, and through this example the 
need for reform becomes clearer.97 
2.  No Consensus Among Epidemiologists on Tort Applications of 
Their Research 
The field of epidemiology is a relative newcomer to the scientific 
research community, when compared to more established and recognized 
fields like medicine or engineering.  As a result, the epidemiology 
                                                                                                                          
90 Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1404–05 (citing Charles H. Hennekens et al., Self-Reported Breast 
Implants and Connective-Tissue Diseases in Female Health Professionals, 275 JAMA 616, 616 (1996) 
(showing a 1.24 relative risk of breast implants to connective tissue diseases)); In re Breast Implant 
Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1227 (reviewing the same study). 
91 Finley, supra note 35, at 352–62. 
92 Green et al., supra note 24, at 374; see generally KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN 
EPIDEMIOLOGY (3d ed. 2008). 
93 See Green et al., supra note 24, at 348, 376 (“Relative risk measures the strength of the 
association.”); see also Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1166 (“[P]robability of 
causation cannot be computed solely from the relative risk.”); Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, 
Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 256, 
263–64 (1992) (noting that causation cannot be determined solely from mathematics). 
94 Green et al., supra note 24, at 375–76; Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: 
Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295–99 (1965) (setting forth nine 
factors to evaluate in determining causation).  For commentary on the influence of the Bradford Hill 
factors in determining cause, see Egilman et al., supra note 54, at 241 (“Hill’s considerations are well 
accepted and have been widely used by epistemologists.”); Thompson, supra note 93, at 266–67 
(stating that the Bradford Hill criteria are widely used by epidemiologists to determine causation). 
95 See Finley, supra note 35, at 359–63 (reviewing the different factors epidemiologists use in 
forming a judgment on causation); Thompson, supra note 93, at 267. 
96 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
97 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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presented in the courtroom lacks a critical component of other scientific 
fields which judges can rely upon: consensus within the field on the 
application of the research to tort or other legal use.  As a result, judges 
find themselves instituting standards on scientific endeavors, like in the 
doubling-of-the-risk controversy. 
In a field of established scientific research like medicine, courts face 
several advantages in making Daubert determinations.  First, the 
parameters of the field of medicine are more commonly understood by 
laypersons, partially as a consequence of the age of the discipline but also 
from individual experiences with a physician.98 
Second, professional associations in medicine have developed some 
generally accepted standards for the presentation of expert testimony in the 
courtroom.99  For example, physicians testifying in a tort case will 
understand that a key component will be whether the care was within or 
outside the “standard of care.”100  While physicians may differ on the 
conclusion, the framework for the analysis is well understood and 
relatively clear.  Finally, the medical profession has worked together with 
the legal profession in forming joint committees to draft interprofessional 
codes of formalized standards for expert witnesses, like the American 
Medical Association (“AMA”)–American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
                                                                                                                          
98 Larry A. Green et al., The Ecology of Medical Care Revisited, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2021, 
2023 (2001) (stating that in a typical month, over twenty percent of adults in the United States visit a 
physician); Eric W. Nawar et al., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., National Hospital Ambulatory 
Medical Care Survey, in ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, NO. 386, at 1, 2 
(2007) (noting 115.3 million emergency room visits in the United States in 2005, for a population of 
296 million); see also, Minnesota v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 767–68 (Minn. 1990) (Wahl, J., 
dissenting) (reviewing studies showing one of three Americans has sought or has had a family member 
seek help from a psychiatrist or psychologist). 
99 HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES §§ 265.992 (Expert Witness Testimony), 265.994 (Expert Witness Testimony—Clinical 
Issues), 265.995 (Guidelines for Expert Witness), 265.997 (AMA-ABA Statement on Interprofessional 
Relations for Physicians and Attorneys), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-
Ethics.pdf.  While aspirational, these guidelines serve as a reminder of a proposed minimal standard for 
expert witness conduct and ethics, and represent the involvement of the profession in standardizing 
legal application of the science.  See Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Role of Professional 
Organizations in Regulating Physician Expert Witness Testimony, 298 JAMA 2907, 2909 (2007) (“The 
increase in extrajudicial regulation of physicians in their capacity as expert witnesses . . . is 
unmistakable.”). 
100 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the 
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384 
(1994) (“The central legal task in . . . a medical malpractice suit, is to determine the standard of care . . . 
[using] the customary practices of the medical profession as the benchmark of acceptable behavior.”); 
Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical 
Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1212–13 (1992) (noting that custom-based standard of care 
defines physician duty).  Certain commentators see a trend of courts shifting away from custom-based 
standards of care.  See, e.g., Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: 
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000). 
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Statement on Interprofessional Relations for Physicians and Attorneys.101  
Through more generalized consensus, a field of science like medicine can 
create for itself certain standards for legal use of the science, thus relieving 
the court of the burden of implementing those standards on an unfamiliar 
field. 
Epidemiology lacks the structures that assist judges in these more 
established fields.  First, most citizens or judges have little experience 
dealing with epidemiologic analysis, and the concepts in expert 
epidemiologic testimony are difficult.102  Second, the field of epidemiology 
lacks inherent standards for tort legal use.  Epidemiology developed 
largely in the area of regulatory law, regarding questions of population-
level risks from exposures to toxic agents.103  Noted epidemiologist Dr. 
Joseph Rodricks and his coauthor observe that within the regulatory 
application of epidemiology, “many methodological concepts are clear and 
reasonably well accepted.  This is not at all the case regarding the issues 
that arise in tort and product liability cases.”104  The result is that debates 
over epidemiologic methodology occur within the courtroom with the 
judge as the referee, rather than outside the heated context of an individual 
case.105  Finally, there is little interprofessional involvement of the 
communities of the type exemplified by the AMA and ABA.106  All of 
these factors combine to leave judges as the arbiters of the legal application 
of complex science, but only within a single case and without systematic 
guidance. 
The fact that the field of epidemiology is relatively new to science, has 
focused more on the regulatory application of the discipline, and lacks 
interprofessional codes for tort legal use, results in judges making 
fundamental rules about application of the science within the courtroom to 
a much greater extent than in more established fields.  As with the 
fundamental complexity of the field, this scenario results in an important 
test case on the limits of judicial decision making in the Daubert regime. 
                                                                                                                          
101 HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES, supra note 99, § 265.997.  Joint interprofessional committees are common on the state and 
local level as well.  See Andrew W. Jurs, The Rationale for Expert Immunity or Liability Exposure and 
Case Law Since Briscoe: Reasserting Immunity Protection for Friendly Expert Witnesses, 38 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 49, 90–91 n.232 (2008) (listing state and local interprofessional organizations and codes). 
102 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
1121, 1146–48 (2001) (reviewing studies evaluating jury confusion regarding epidemiologic evidence); 
see also In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1-03-CV-17000, 2005 WL 1868046, at *34 n.78 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2005) (recognizing that epidemiology evidence challenges jurors with complex 
issues of methodology).  For additional discussion on this issue, see infra Part III.A. 
103 Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 23, 31. 
104 Id. at 31. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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3.  Epidemiology Alone as Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases 
In addition to the fundamental complexity of the field and the lack of 
standards for tort legal use, a third factor also contributes to the example of 
epidemiology as a good test case for the application of the Daubert 
standard to science: the use of epidemiologic analysis as the sole method 
for proof of the causation element in complex tort cases. 
In establishing a claim for toxic exposure, a critical connection for the 
jury to make will involve the connection between exposure to a chemical 
and a particular disease of the plaintiff.  Randomized experimental studies 
with a control group are the ideal type of study to measure the relationship 
between exposure and disease.107  The Food and Drug Administration 
requires these randomized controlled studies in making determinations of 
whether a new drug is “safe and effective” under federal law.108  
Controlled studies are not ethical for harmful agents, however.109 
Without the controlled randomized studies, and in the absence of 
advanced knowledge on the molecular and biologic pathology of the 
disease course, epidemiologic studies by a trained researcher must provide 
the evidence of a causal link.110  The studies will evaluate the health 
outcomes in a population and compare the substances to similar 
chemicals.111  Then, a trained epidemiologist may develop an informed, but 
necessarily subjective, conclusion on causation.112 
As a result of the inability to perform other studies, and the lack of 
more definitive biological or pathological evidence of causation, the 
epidemiologist’s analysis and informed opinion will provide the court with 
the main, or sole, evidence on the issue of causation.113  With the causal 
connection resting in epidemiologic proof alone, the courts must assess 
these studies in isolation.  Consequently, the studies are indispensable to 
plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation.114  More succinctly, the initial Federal 
Judicial Center Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (“Reference 
Manual”) noted:  “In the absence of an understanding of the biological and 
                                                                                                                          
107 Green et al., supra note 24, at 338. 
108 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2009). 
109 Green et al., supra note 24, at 339. 
110 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 355–56. 
111 Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 
1012 (2001). 
112 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 356–57; Green, supra note 51, at 375. 
113 Martin L. Norton, The Physician Expert Witness and the U.S. Supreme Court—An 
Epidemiologic Approach, 21 MED. & L. 435, 440–41 (2002). 
114 Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as Politics—The 
Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2003); see also In re Joint E. & 
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1026–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing the usefulness of 
epidemiological evidence). 
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pathological mechanisms by which disease develops, epidemiological 
evidence is the most valid type of scientific evidence of toxic causation.”115 
Following the Reference Manual affirming the importance of 
epidemiologic studies in the absence of other methods of causation, courts 
would adopt similar language.  In In re Breast Implant Litigation, Judge 
Sparr wrote:  “Epidemiology is the best evidence of causation in the mass 
torts context.”116  In a drug tort case, Hollander v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals 
Corp., Judge Thompson cited both the Reference Manual and Judge Sparr 
for the proposition that the epidemiologic evidence would be “the most 
valid type of scientific evidence of toxic causation.”117 
Because of its crucial role in toxic torts, and because of its isolation in 
establishing causation in the absence of other definitive studies, courts 
evaluating epidemiology in toxic tort cases handle complex, but similar, 
fact questions at the cutting-edge of science.  The test cases provide a 
sample of judges dealing with similar cases, similar issues, and even 
identical scientists, showing how the judiciary as a whole handles the most 
difficult Daubert challenges. 
4.  Result 
With a combination of these factors—the complexity, the lack of 
standards within the profession for tort-legal use, and the use of 
epidemiology alone to prove causation—courts reach the outer limits of 
their capacity to make difficult gatekeeping determinations under Daubert.  
Inconsistent handling of the evidence appears as one result.118  However, 
the combination of these factors makes the judicial handling of 
epidemiologic risk analysis a “test case” for the Daubert regime, and 
exposes difficulties that can be anticipated for future Rule 702 reviews. 
III.  EPIDEMIOLOGIC RISK CASES SHOW WEAKNESSES IN JUDICIAL 
HANDLING OF SCIENCE  
Since Daubert, the epidemiologic risk assessment controversy cases 
demonstrate judges’ treatment of complex cutting-edge epidemiologic 
science, thereby providing a discrete group of opinions on which the 
judicial ability to handle complex science can be assessed.  Evaluating the 
                                                                                                                          
115 Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121, 126 (1st ed. 1994) (emphasis added). 
116 In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing Bailey et al., 
supra note 115, at 126). 
117 Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1235 n.14 (W.D. Okla. 2000), aff’d in 
part, 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; 
Bailey et al., supra note 115, at 126) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118 See discussion supra Parts II.B.–D. 
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judicial opinions in these cases demonstrates some of the weaknesses of 
the Daubert regime. 
Some of the difficulties seen in the epidemiologic risk controversy 
include basic judicial knowledge of scientific processes, the judicial 
handling of statistical/mathematical evidence, use of bright-line tests that 
may not be scientifically sound, outlier enhancement of experts, and the 
constraints of legal procedure on science.  By evaluating each of these 
difficulties, we can recognize inherent weaknesses in the judicial handling 
of complex science in the epidemiologic risk controversy that may also 
affect other cutting-edge scientific controversies subject to Daubert 
review. 
A.  Judicial Knowledge of and Background with Scientific Principles 
Epidemiologic risk case law shows judges evaluating extremely 
complex science, in a field lacking consensus among researchers, when the 
admissibility decision will either permit the plaintiff to proceed, or end the 
case.  Daubert anticipated that judges would be placed in this role.119  In 
the epidemiologic risk controversy, judges are openly skeptical of their 
abilities to analyze the epidemiologic evidence, but then must in detail 
analyze the expert opinions on the science.120  Do judges have the skills to 
make these decisions?  Justice Stephen Breyer remains skeptical:  “[M]ost 
judges lack the scientific training that might facilitate the evaluation of 
scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who make such 
claims.”121 
In evaluating the judicial capacity to analyze complex science, two 
essential questions should be addressed: the scientific background of the 
judiciary, and judicial familiarity with the essential components of the 
scientific method.  By reviewing the research on these issues, some doubt 
in the Daubert assumption that judges “possess the capacity to undertake 
this review” must be acknowledged.122 
Two studies performed by social science researchers directly measured 
the scientific background of judges.123  In a 2001 study, Sophia Gatowski 
and her colleagues surveyed 400 state court judges to determine their 
scientific backgrounds, their views on Daubert, and their knowledge of 
                                                                                                                          
119 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
120 E.g., Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). 
121 Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 1, 4 (2d ed., 2000). 
122 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
123 See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 435 (2001); Valerie 
P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19, 19–21 (2007). 
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scientific principles.124  The results show that judges lack preparation for 
their Daubert role. 
When asked to discuss their educational training, 85% of judges had 
some social science coursework in their past, while 77% had coursework in 
the physical sciences, and 67% in biological sciences.125  Finally, while 
some judges did get training in specific scientific areas, a vast majority 
(96%) of those judges found the training lacking on the general scientific 
methods and principles.126  In conclusion, judges split 52% to 48% on the 
issue of whether they had enough science in their background to prepare 
them for the complex issues handled under Daubert.127  As a result, the 
Gatowski study shows that judges themselves question their experience to 
make the tough calls necessary under Daubert. 
Dr. Valerie Hans’s study involving judicial background sheds 
additional light on this issue.128  Dr. Hans surveyed judges in order to 
compare their reactions to juror responses in her study Judges, Juries, and 
Scientific Evidence.129  By surveying sixty-five judges, all of whom 
attended a “Science for Judges” conference, Hans provided additional 
insight into judicial scientific background.130 
In the Hans study, judges reported 10.29 classes from high school and 
college in math and science, compared to the jurors’ average of 9.72.131  
When compared to jurors with college degrees—who showed an average 
of 14.04 classes—as opposed to the overall jury pool, judges showed a 
significant deficit in math and science training.132  Of the sixty-five judges 
surveyed, only five (7.7%) reported having some job experience with math 
or science.133 
Through the Gatowski and Hans studies, empirical research 
demonstrates that the judiciary is poorly prepared to handle the difficult 
scientific issues presented in courtrooms.  Average jurors are not 
statistically worse off than judges, and judges are deficient as compared to 
a group of college-educated jurors.134  The judges themselves recognize 
                                                                                                                          
124 Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 435. 
125 Id. at 442.  For a comparison of this data to the data from Dr. Hans’s study, see infra notes 
131–32 and accompanying text. 
126 Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442. 
127 Id. 
128 Hans, supra note 123, at 19–20. 
129 Id. at 29. 
130 Id. at 28. 
131 Id. at 30.  Dr. Hans saw this difference as not statistically different.  Id. 
132 Id.  This appears to be a more appropriate sample with which to compare judges, who have 
college and law degrees. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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this deficiency, splitting on the issue of whether they have the background 
to make decisions on Daubert issues.135 
Background need not condemn judges to inadequate performance, 
however, so it is also important to review judicial scores on their current 
ability to handle science.  In the Gatowski study, judges responded to 
questions on basic scientific study principles, regarding falsifiability, error 
rate, peer review, and general acceptance.136  Judges answered that these 
factors, enumerated in the Daubert opinion for the review of scientific 
reliability,137 were useful in evaluating science under Daubert.138  In 
defining some of these admittedly important principles, the judges scored 
poorly.  On the issue of error rate, the study indicated that only four 
percent of the sample judges could correctly demonstrate “true 
understanding” of the concept.139  On the issue of falsifiability, the study 
indicated that only six percent of judges could demonstrate a “true 
understanding” of the principle.140  While scores for peer review and 
general acceptance were higher,141 Gatowski’s study shows a judiciary 
struggling with basic scientific concepts. 
Hans also studied judicial performance on application of scientific 
principles, by testing judicial and juror responses to a questionnaire 
regarding DNA evidence after a videotaped mock trial on the issue.142  Out 
of eleven questions regarding the DNA evidence, judges fared better than 
the total jury pool on three questions.143  When compared to the college-
educated juror group, the judges scored lower than the jurors on three of 
the eleven questions, and exceeded the college-educated jurors on one 
question.144  Again considering that judges all will be college-educated,145 
this performance is underwhelming. 
In the epidemiologic risk controversy, basic definitional errors about 
the application of relative risk resulted in judges evaluating epidemiologic 
evidence outside its usual application.146  It is important to note that we 
need not assume that judges have little experience with epidemiology from 
                                                                                                                          
135 Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442. 
136 Id. at 444–48. 
137 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
138 Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 444–47 (noting favorable responses of falsifiability (88%), 
error rate (91%), peer review (92%), and general acceptance (93%)). 
139 Id. at 447. 
140 Id. at 444. 
141 See id. at 447–48 (noting results of 71% peer review and 82% general acceptance). 
142 Hans, supra note 123, at 29. 
143 Id. at 36. 
144 Id. at 37–38. 
145 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that in the Hans study, “judges showed a 
significant deficit in math and science training”). 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 48–50 (discussing the difficulty of using a population-wide 
study to assess the risks of an individual). 
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the case law alone; rather, the Gatowski study indicated that a large 
majority of judges had “no experience at all” with epidemiology.147  Use of 
epidemiology to extrapolate causation to a specific plaintiff requires the 
legal use of epidemiologic definitions beyond the scope of what 
researchers would do in the lab.148  Lack of familiarity with the 
complexities of the scientific field, based on background demographics or 
understanding of concepts, appears to play a role in these errors. 
When this data is reviewed in relation to the epidemiologic risk 
controversy,149 one must wonder if the judges are truly “up to the task” as 
Daubert assumed.150  Reform efforts should address judges’ deficit in 
training and application of scientific principles, seeking a solution to the 
weaknesses exposed by the empirical research of Gatowski and Hans.151 
B.  Judicial Difficulty with the Use of Statistics 
General scientific principles are not the sole area where judges score 
poorly in empirical studies.152  The judicial handling of complex statistical 
data is a distinct and critically important part of the Daubert system, 
mandating review for judicial competence. 
In an important study on the issue of judicial handling of statistical 
information, Dr. Gary Wells studied the handling of statistics by judges as 
compared to mock jurors (psychology students).153  By presenting the 
jurors and judges with varying statistical information on a potential 
liability issue in a mock case, and then comparing the data with results 
from a similar probability issue without the statistical involvement, Wells 
concluded that judges and the mock jurors were equally poor in analysis of 
                                                                                                                          
147 Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442 (noting that seventy-three percent of judges have no 
experience at all with epidemiology). 
148 See, e.g., Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321–22 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting experts were unable to 
provide sufficient evidence to prove causation); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 
1403–04 (D. Or. 1996) (discussing Daubert II and applying its evidentiary standards to the case); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 19–23, 26–28 (discussing Daubert II and its holding that the 
standard of proof is met when a substance’s relative risk to cause an injury is above 2.0). 
149 See discussion supra Parts II.B.–E. (discussing epidemiological risk overview in relation to 
judges’ evaluation of such evidence). 
150 For discussion on whether the lack of knowledge results in poor admissibility decisions under 
Daubert, see Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 926–28 (2003) (analyzing Margaret 
Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality on Judge 
Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
574, 575 (2000)). 
151 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing reform efforts to help judges make informed 
decisions). 
152 See discussion supra Part III.A. (discussing the areas in which judges lack certain training that 
would assist in their evaluation of scientific claims). 
153 Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 739 (1992).  
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statistical evidence.154  Of interest for Daubert purposes, the judges showed 
wide variance on their determinations of liability for the mock case when 
the judges reviewed statistical data, as compared to when the judges 
reviewed equally probable non-statistical information.155  Wells noted that 
there was “no theoretical reason in the current psychological literature to 
expect that these versions of the evidence, which yield functionally 
equivalent subjective probabilities, would produce highly discrepant 
verdicts.”156  As a result, the judicial handling of statistical evidence may 
not be a strength of the Daubert approach. 
Other studies support the Wells results.  A National Research Council 
collection of six case studies regarding statistical assessment in a variety of 
case settings supports the conclusion that judges fare poorly with statistical 
analysis.157  The editor of the National Research Council collection, in a 
different study, declared that “the complexity of statistical issues raised in 
some cases will clearly put a resolution of conflicting expert testimony 
beyond the ken of even the most thoughtful and well-trained jurist.”158  
Examination of statistical evidence in Title VII litigation led Richard 
Lempert to the same conclusion:  “[S]tatistically untrained judges are 
poorly equipped to make distinctions regarding statistical precedent.”159  
Legal commentators note that this weakness affects the Daubert 
assumption of judicial competence to handle complex cutting-edge science 
involving statistics.160  In sum, the “reception of statistical evidence in the 
courtroom has been cautious at best and uninformed at worst; the nonuse 
and misuse of statistics have been more common than its use.”161 
Judges’ poor performance with statistical evidence casts doubt on their 
                                                                                                                          
154 See id. at 748 (noting that both judges and psychology students made similar decisions based 
on statistics, but that statistics were often ignored when using the preponderance of evidence standard). 
155 Id. at 739, 743 (noting that students and trial judges averaged fewer than ten percent 
affirmative decisions of liability based on statistical evidence alone, while the subjects averaged sixty-
five percent affirmative decisions of liability using other forms of evidence). 
156 Id. at 750. 
157 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN 
THE COURTS 72 (S.E. Fienberg ed., 1989). 
158 Stephen E. Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in 
Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 784, 786–87 (1982). 
159 Richard Lempert, Befuddled Judges: Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, in LEGACIES OF 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 263, 278 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). 
160 See Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 6 (“[J]udges and lawyers may need to experience a 
quantum leap in the subtleties of scientific inquiry in order to prevent various simplified views of 
scientific evidence from undermining and subverting the goals of tort law.”); Gatowski et al., supra 
note 123, at 454 (“[T]he survey findings raise concerns, however, about how well judges can exercise 
their discretion if they lack the requisite understanding of science and its methods.”); Vidmar & 
Diamond, supra note 102, at 1170–73 (discussing recent studies that investigate whether judges are 
superior to juries in interpreting statistical evidence). 
161 DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 3–4 (1986); 
see Breyer, supra note 121, at 4. 
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ability to evaluate epidemiology under Daubert.  Initially, it is important to 
note again that the Gatowski study showed a substantial majority of judges 
had no experience with epidemiologic evidence,162 and therefore its 
statistical underpinnings.  Since epidemiologists “speak in the statistical 
language of risks and probabilities,”163 the role of statistical literacy in 
Daubert determinations regarding epidemiology cannot be understated. 
Evaluation of the judicial handling of statistical information in the 
epidemiologic risk controversy cases demonstrates the judicial difficulty in 
analyzing and weighing statistical information.  Statistical weakness leads 
to two scientifically false propositions from the epidemiology case law: 
probability of causation being computed solely from relative risk, and the 
bright-line determination of an exposure dose that results in a probability 
of causation exceeding fifty percent, equaling the “doubling dose” for all 
individuals.164  Essentially, the courts have adopted a statistical test that 
scientists devalue as representing what the courts believe it represents.165 
When the use/misuse of statistics is evaluated in the epidemiologic risk 
controversy, one must again wonder if judges are “up to the task,” as 
Daubert suggested.  Reform efforts must also address judges’ lack of 
statistical background and misuse of statistical principles, seeking a 
solution to the weaknesses exposed by the studies done by Wells, the 
National Research Council, and others, as well as the epidemiologic case 
law.166 
C.  Bright-Line Tests May Not be Scientifically Sound 
The Daubert framework allows for the ultimate bright-line test: 
admissibility.  Of course it is proper that judges should make these choices. 
But in the creation of bright-line rules about science, and then using those 
rules—scientifically sound, and otherwise—to make evidence 
admissibility determinations, judges risk enshrining poor science into law.  
The epidemiologic relative risk controversy is a textbook example of 
bright-line rule valuation trumping scientific principles. 
A bright-line rule is, by definition, a rule of decision that resolves 
ambiguities at the potential expense of equity.167  Bright-line rules can 
                                                                                                                          
162 Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442 (reporting that seventy-three percent of judges indicate 
no experience at all with epidemiology). 
163 In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1995). 
164 Greenland, Methodologic Error, supra note 44, at 1166.  For examples of the use of these 
doubling dose/relative risk numbers in cases for the “more likely than not” standard, see discussion 
supra Part II.B.  Regarding courts rejecting this approach as unsound, see infra text accompanying 
notes 167–84.  See also Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 45, at 209 (criticizing the use of the 
doubling/dose relative risk standard). 
165 Thompson, supra note 93, at 264–65. 
166 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing appropriate suggestions for successful reform). 
167 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004). 
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work well in the judicial system, providing ease of application, notice, and 
clear standards.  As a result, bright-line tests appeal to courts in a diverse 
range of legal disputes, from First Amendment case law,168 to Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure cases,169 to antitrust litigation.170  The 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition recognizes that the clarity of the rule is 
achieved at the potential cost of equity. 
In the epidemiologic risk controversy, courts enshrined bright-line tests 
for relative risks in order to prove causation.171  In doing so, courts 
sacrificed scientific validity at the altar of certainty.  Part of the problem is 
the competing cultures of the fields of law and science.172  Uncertainty 
remains an integral part of scientific analysis.173  After all research is 
completed, data taken, and analysis performed, scientists recognize the 
place for uncertainty.174  Epidemiology is a field that contains a large 
degree of subjective analysis, involving uncertainty and the analysis 
thereof.175 
In overemphasizing the bright-line tests, courts gloss over the 
uncertainty inherent in the epidemiologic analysis with a veneer of 
objectivity.176  In doing so, the courts deviate from the practice of 
scientists,177 who must perform their research with additional complicating 
subjective factors.178  Finally, the bright-line rule negatively affects the 
                                                                                                                          
168 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (creating a bright-line rule 
that “prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his 
official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with ‘actual malice’” in certain 
circumstances); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling 
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 716–17 (1978) (discussing, in part, the bright-line test used to determine 
what speech constitutes obscenity). 
169 See, e.g., Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and 
Its Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 375–76 (2004) (discussing, for example, the bright-line rule 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court with regard to the permissible scope of a search and 
seizure without a warrant). 
170 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1211, 1259 (2008) (noting that antitrust law is “rife with 
categorical distinctions,” that bright-line rules have developed in the courts and are not necessarily 
related to antitrust statutes, and that bright-line rules are valuable in that they allow for business 
strategy planning). 
171 See discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing Daubert II and the development of the rule 
regarding relative risk). 
172 See Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293–94 (discussing conflict between sound 
scientific principles and the adjudication process). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 356–57; Finley, supra note 35, at 365. 
176 Finley, supra note 35, at 365; see also Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 58 (noting that statistical 
associational probabilities are only one form of relevant evidence important to decision-making). 
177 See Finley, supra note 35, at 359–62 (discussing courts’ implicit and explicit deviation from 
strict adherence to scientific principles when considering epidemiological evidence). 
178 See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing epidemiologists’ role in the 
adjudication process). 
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perception of other, less seemingly objective, scientific principles.179 
Some courts clearly recognized the problem with making certainty out 
of scientific judgment and doubt.180  The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected 
the need for a bright-line approach in In re Hanford:  “[T]he validity of a 
claim should not depend on whether a plaintiff was exposed to a fraction of 
a rem lower than the ‘doubling dose.’”181  In doing so, the panel recognized 
a flaw in the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Daubert II.182  The 
rejection of the bright-line approach produced a different result in In re 
Hanford, but the Daubert II precedent had been relied upon for seven years 
to that point, and it continues to influence decisions today.183 
Bright-line tests play an important role in the legal system, and clearly 
can have beneficial effects.  The epidemiologic risk controversy shows the 
valuation of bright-line tests can come with unexpected or undesirable 
consequences, and may lack scientific validity.  Reform efforts must note 
the tendency of the law to seek objectivity, even when it may not be 
present or used by the field, in the evaluation of scientific evidence under 
Daubert.184 
D.  Outlier Enhancement Concerns 
Yet another consideration for evaluation of complex science under the 
Daubert standard is the issue of “outlier enhancement”; that is, when the 
scientific evidence presented gives the court a false or incomplete picture 
of the state of the overall scientific knowledge in the field.  Both run-of-
the-mill and highly complex scientific issues can potentially suffer from 
this difficulty, although the more complex the science, the less likely the 
judge will be to be able to spot and compensate for the potential of skewed 
science.185 
                                                                                                                          
179 See Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 58 (noting that courts’ use of stringent rules in deciding the 
admissibility of evidence “may lead to consideration of a narrower range of evidence” than scientists 
would normally consider). 
180 See discussion supra Part II.D. (noting courts that have rejected the Daubert II bright-line 
rule). 
181 In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). 
182 See id.  By holding that the validity of a claim should not depend on a bright-line rule, the 
panel effectively disagreed with the Daubert II court’s use of the “doubling dose” standard.  See id. 
183 See, e.g., Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2009) 
(citing Daubert II as controlling precedent). 
184 See discussion infra Part IV (detailing reform efforts that will, in part, consider the tendency of 
the law to seek objectivity by ensuring courts take science into account prior to making decisions). 
185 Both the judge and the jury will usually, as untrained non-experts, have difficulty evaluating 
the weaknesses and overall state of science in the field.  Bernstein, supra note 3, at 486; see also 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 
1009, 1030–31 (2008) (discussing use of expert judges and juries as solution to the problem); Joseph 
Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 37–39 (1993) (noting that even with the use of expert witnesses, juries will have difficulty 
ascertaining whether the expert’s opinion is, in fact, accurate). 
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Selection bias can occur through a litigant’s selection of an expert 
mainly in order to represent a perspective on science that a litigant 
proposes for his/her case.186  The bias is based in the narrow interest of the 
party to maximize the persuasive effect of the presentation to the jury in 
the promotion of the case.187 
In a more general sense, the problem of outlier enhancement is a 
byproduct of the basic antithesis between the legal and scientific methods.  
Scientific inquiry is rooted in the testing of opinions through the collection 
of data, debate among alternatives, recognition of the limitations or areas 
of uncertainty in the field, and the assumptions necessary to make a 
conclusion.188  Legal process involves the partisan presentation of materials 
to a necessarily generalist jury pool.189  The method of decision making has 
a great effect on the selection of experts. 
Experts in the fields of science should remain open-minded, recognize 
the limitations of their research, and should be open to the consideration of 
new theories or hypotheses.190  In contrast, expert witnesses get selected 
for their positions in the field, loyalty for the client, and advocacy.191 
Two byproducts of expert witness bias in the legal system are 
immediately apparent: that experts selected by a party in a legal case may 
represent opinions that are accepted by only a small minority of persons in 
their field,192 and that opposing experts must be neutralized by attack 
whether or not their position is more or less valid than the opposing 
viewpoint.193 
                                                                                                                          
186 See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456 (discussing selection bias with those providing expert 
testimony). 
187 See Mnookin, supra note 185, at 1011 (noting that the typical expert witness is one who might 
not be the most knowledgeable expert, but is often the one who is most persuasive to the jury). 
188 See Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293 (arguing that scientific inferences are 
“derived from assumptions as well as from data”). 
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See Sanders, supra note 185, at 37 (“Persuasiveness is not always a useful indicator of truth.”). 
190 See Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293–94 (discussing basic goals of scientific 
reporting). 
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toxic torts, see Sanders, supra note 185, at 26 n.130.  See also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456 
(discussing selection bias in the context of choosing expert witnesses). 
192 See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 102, at 1133 (discussing the fact that some experts’ 
opinions do not represent the majority position on particular issues); see also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 
456–57 (discussing a jury’s perspective when hearing multiple experts’ testimony); Greenland, Critical 
Appraisal, supra note 2, at 305 (noting that scientists represent their own viewpoints as standard within 
the field). 
193 See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 102, at 1133–34 (noting that the adversary system pits one 
expert against the other); see also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456–57 (arguing that when the consensus 
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When the Daubert regime replaced the Frye system, the consideration 
of “general acceptance” of the scientific information changed from the 
central analysis on the admissibility of the testimony, to one of many 
considerations in a multi-factorial test for reliability.194  After Daubert, 
judges applying the multi-factorial Daubert reliability test must also 
consider error rate, peer review, methodology, existence of standards and 
controls, and overall methodology, in addition to or instead of analyzing 
general acceptance.195  Added to the problem is that judges, untrained in 
science themselves,196 are more likely to see “science” as a logical, 
coherent, and largely irrefutable process seeking truth from the natural 
world.197  Under these circumstances and with this viewpoint, scientists 
outside the mainstream are more likely, if not nearly universal, in the 
analyses of scientific disputes in the court; these “outliers” have stormed 
the courtroom with nonstandard or unusual science, as part of the 
adversarial system. 
The epidemiologic risk controversy is an example of the “outlier 
enhancement” of scientists in the courtroom.  The acceptance of 
epidemiologic relative risk as the sine qua non of causation in toxic torts is 
an example of the science within the courtroom clearly diverting away 
from the mainstream practice of science.198  As one epidemiologist notes, 
the doubling-of-the-risk analysis of the Ninth Circuit in Daubert II “is not 
the most reasonable inference [for the court] to make.”199  Rather, the 
court’s determinations were suspect, and it “seems clear that a substantially 
different conclusion would have been reached on some of these scientific 
issues in the regulatory context.”200  There lies the problem: judges making 
decisions on complex science, outside of their expertise, guided by experts 
selected based on their loyalty to the party and advocacy for the cause.201  
As a result, judges make decisions memorializing questionable scientific 
                                                                                                                          
lies closer to one expert’s view, a jury gets a false sense that the litigated issue is a close one); 
Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 294 (noting that lawyers are working in an adversary 
system and need to protect their client’s interests); Sanders, supra note 185, at 47 (“[C]ross-
examination becomes a ritual that does not little to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of a witness’ 
testimony.”). 
194 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 13–15. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 13–15 (discussing the new Daubert requirements). 
196 See discussion supra Parts III.A.–B. 
197 See Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 330–31 (noting that judges are likely to require scientists 
“to make generalizations from observations or data to general laws of nature”). 
198 See discussion supra Part II.B. and supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing 
epidemiology and noting that evaluation of science in the courtroom can be difficult, uncomfortable, or 
daunting). 
199 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 354. 
200 Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 29. 
201 See supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting that judges tend to have more difficulty 
identifying skewed science when the scientific complexity of an issue increases). 
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reasoning into decisions. 
Expert witnesses play an important role in the legal system, and clearly 
are necessary to assist the jury/judge in evaluating scientific or technical 
issues.  The epidemiologic risk controversy shows that reliance on experts, 
largely selected for their loyalty and advocacy to a party in an adversarial 
system, can result in non-representative science being presented within the 
courtroom that would not succeed in the scientific field.  Reform efforts 
must take into account this procedural and systematic concern when 
seeking appropriate amendments to the system of evaluation of scientific 
evidence under Daubert.202 
E.  Constraints of Legal Procedure 
In addition to the concerns about judicial scientific and statistical 
backgrounds, bright-line rules, and outlier enhancement, concerns about 
the legal system structure also deserve mention for consideration in reform 
efforts.  Two examples—the role of cross-examination in expert evaluation 
and discovery timelines under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—will 
provide some insight into the procedural problems affecting the quality of 
complex science in the courtroom. 
1.  Cross-Examination 
Cross-examination is considered the “greatest legal engine ever created 
for the discovery of truth.”203  It is the central right of the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,204 and is so central to the 
determination of truth in many civil cases as to be required by due 
process.205  Clearly cross-examination will and must remain a facet of trial 
practice. 
This is not to say, however, that in the context of complex or cutting-
edge science that cross-examination is foolproof or flawless.  Cross-
examination can feed upon the jury’s preconceived notions of the truth and 
fact.  As an example, in one study performed in a simulated rape trial, an 
attorney introduced through cross-examination a negative fact about the 
                                                                                                                          
202 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing various ways to improve courts’ ability to process 
complex scientific evidence). 
203 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d 
ed. 1940)). 
204 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–61 (2004) (discussing the Sixth Amendment 
and how courts seek reliable evidence in part through cross-examination). 
205 See, e.g., Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that in 
civil cases, “live testimony and cross-examination might be so important as to be required by due 
process,” although noting judicial equivocation on the issue). 
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expert.206  Even when denied and uncorroborated, the innuendo of the 
cross-examination question negatively affected the credibility of the 
expert.207  The study’s authors concluded that “the use of presumptuous 
questions is a dirty trick that can be used to distort jurors’ evaluations of a 
witness’ credibility.  As cross-examiners regularly employ such tactics, 
judges should be aware of the dangers and make a serious effort to control 
them.”208  Note that in this study, the researchers used a presumed fact 
based in common-sense regarding the outside perception of the experts’ 
research. 
In a case involving complex or cutting-edge scientific thought, 
improper cross-examination questions have an even greater chance to 
influence the jury.209  When expert testimony has been approved, jurors are 
necessarily unknowledgeable about the subject matter involved.210  So 
should the cross-examining attorney introduce a fact regarding the subject 
of the science rather than a common-sense perception about the expert, the 
jury is necessarily unable to make an objective determination about that 
fact.211  When lacking the necessary signposts to evaluate material, the 
jurors can unintentionally oversimplify the material and rely 
overwhelmingly on peripheral cues.212  The more difficult the material, the 
more likely the jury will have to rely on non-central peripheral cues, rather 
than an understanding of the details of the testimony.213  In many complex 
cases, cross-examination will feed to these jury biases by focusing on 
tangential areas of credibility, from accepting fees for expert review to the 
perception of inconsistency with deposition testimony.214  Cross-
examination in this context becomes a ritual: less about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the expert opinions and more about jury bias and peripheral 
matters.215  Research has shown that juror comprehension in complex 
                                                                                                                          
206 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination: The Influence of Conjectural 
Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 376 (1990) (noting that the negative fact regards 
whether the expert’s data has been “sharply criticized”). 
207 Id. at 378. 
208 Id. at 382 (internal citations omitted). 
209 For an evaluation of various studies in complex and other fields, see Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & 
Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 447–49 (2003). 
210 FED. R. EVID. 702.  See Mnookin, supra note 185, at 1012 (noting that expert witnesses are 
necessary because the jury would otherwise not be knowledgeable about the subject at hand). 
211 See Mnookin, supra note 185, at 1012–14 (discussing evaluation of competence of an expert 
witness). 
212 See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 102, at 1138–39 (noting that juries often take “mental 
short cuts” when evaluating expert testimony). 
213 See id. at 1139 (stating that jurors often rely on peripheral clues); Mnookin, supra note 185, at 
1013 (noting that jurors often have to rely on “proxy criteria” in assessing expert testimony). 
214 See Sanders, supra note 185, at 47–48 (discussing tendency of opposing counsel to attempt to 
discredit an expert witness by highlighting irrelevant facts such as expert fees). 
215 See id. (noting that cross-examination can become ritualistic). 
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epidemiologic cases is less than ideal.216  In evaluating jurors’ knowledge 
about epidemiologic risk after complex trials, several researchers have 
concluded that jurors misunderstood the epidemiologic evidence presented 
to them at trials.217  As a result, at least one study determined that in an 
epidemiologic case, jurors tended to focus on the individual expert’s 
personality and behavior rather than the substance of the testimony.218  The 
cross-examination tactics in complex cases involving epidemiology—
including focusing on tangential issues of credibility or demanding an 
unscientific level of accuracy in any statements—result in the process 
diminishing as a useful tool for the judge or jury to determine facts.219 
Studies showing juror susceptibility to lawyers injecting misleading 
bias information, in addition to the research regarding the complexity and 
uncertainty posed by epidemiologic evidence, demonstrate that jurors’ 
capacity to be misled in complex cases cannot be seriously doubted.  As a 
result, reform including the addition of some level of objectivity, or at most 
signposts of credibility, might allow jurors to focus more on the substance 
of testimony in the most complex cases.220 
2.  Discovery Deadlines 
One final consideration regarding the Daubert regime meriting 
mention is the discovery timeline in federal civil litigation.  The civil 
discovery process involves formalized disclosure of relevant evidence of 
each party well before trial.  While meeting the requirements of due 
process, the discovery process may negatively affect the scientific merit of 
the witnesses as compared to the practice of science outside the courtroom.  
This is particularly true with epidemiologic evidence. 
Discovery timelines are set according to a formalized schedule.  Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, a court will hold a pretrial conference 
and set a discovery schedule including expert witness disclosures.221  
While there is no set time at which the expert disclosure must occur except 
that which is set by the pretrial order, pretrial orders often involve 
                                                                                                                          
216 See supra text accompanying notes 143–44 (discussing studies evaluating juries’ 
comprehension of complex statistical information). 
217 See MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE RAND CORPORATION, THE DEBATE OVER JURY 
PERFORMANCE 24 (1987); Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45, 52 (1993) (noting that complex cases involving 
plaintiffs’ injuries following mass-exposure to certain substances are often difficult for juries to 
decide).  Both studies are discussed, along with complex non-epidemiologic case studies, in Vidmar & 
Diamond, supra note 102, at 1146–49. 
218 SELVIN & PICUS, supra note 217, at viii–ix. 
219 Sanders, supra note 185, at 50–51 (discussing how battling experts tend to diminish benefits of 
cross-examination). 
220 See discussion infra Part IV (noting reform efforts should work toward bringing “science back 
into the courthouse”). 
221 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2). 
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disclosure deadlines early in the case, so that the case may be in an 
advanced procedural posture earlier than otherwise.222  Once set, the 
pretrial order cannot be modified except on a finding of good cause.223  
Through this process, the litigants will discover their opponents’ expert 
witnesses’ identities, the substance of their testimony, and some indication 
of the trial strategy from the expert reports. 
While fair for due process, this procedure is in opposition to the 
general tenets of the scientific method.  Scientists in general are trained to 
utilize new data, reinterpret studies, and take new information into account 
when formulating and testing hypotheses.224  As a result, a researcher must 
be willing to review and analyze new information for the effect it may 
have on the overall theory. 
Epidemiology is a science particularly invested in re-evaluation of new 
information.  Because of the use of epidemiology largely in the regulatory 
public health sphere,225 a premium exists for the early dissemination of 
information regarding public health risks.226  The risks are then taken into 
account and evaluated as continued study progresses.227  Through this 
process, the public health is protected from an exposure where the initial 
data indicates a threat to human health.  However, the system works poorly 
outside the regulatory sphere, in the context of tort litigation.  In the tort 
legal system, the need to disclose particular information at an early stage in 
the proceedings can prevent or limit any additional analysis, or re-analysis, 
of information due to the discovery deadlines, resulting in a limited amount 
of data regarding the issue being contested.228 
Because the Daubert standard asks courts to hold scientists to the same 
standard in the courtroom as used in the laboratory,229 it seems odd to think 
that courts mandate, through discovery procedures, a timeline that excludes 
a valid and appropriate method of scientific inquiry.  While not appropriate 
in every case, some consideration of the effect that a rigid discovery 
timeline has on scientific evidence in the courtroom would also be an 
                                                                                                                          
222 Some states have specific deadlines set into rule. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 16 (providing 
rules regarding trial management). 
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). 
224 See, e.g., Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 293 (noting that a scientist should 
review all available data and may recognize a need for additional study prior to forming a conclusion). 
225 See Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 31 (discussing the epidemiological studies in light of 
the regulatory scheme). 
226 Carruth & Goldstein, supra note 45, at 207. 
227 Id. 
228 Id.; see Cranor et al., supra note 25, at 61 (noting that judges should consider whether 
admission of certain types of evidence will further the legal purposes of tort law). 
229 Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 
316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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appropriate consideration for reform efforts.230 
IV.  SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM TO ADDRESS THE IDENTIFIED 
WEAKNESSES 
The epidemiologic risk controversy exposed Daubert as a system with 
multiple problems with judicial evaluation of cutting-edge complex 
science, including basic judicial knowledge of scientific principles, the 
judicial handling of statistical evidence, use of bright-line tests that may 
not be scientifically sound, outlier enhancement, and the constraints of the 
legal process on science. 
Having reviewed and analyzed the nature of each difficulty, this 
section will now address potential solutions to those exposed weaknesses.  
In doing so, the goal is to forge a better compromise between science and 
the courtroom, in order to increase the efficiency, accuracy, and 
consistency of judicial gatekeeping decisions under Daubert. 
A.  Use of Rule 706 Experts as Judicial Science Consultants 
The first area ripe for modification is the current structure of the Court 
Appointed Expert Rule, to allow for appointment of a science consultant to 
assist the judge with gatekeeping under Daubert.  The current rules create 
practical restraints on the appointment of an independent expert, so 
modification of the current system would encourage science consultants to 
be appointed in appropriate cases.231  As a result, the use of independent 
experts can shift from the exception rather than the rule to an expectation 
in most complex tort cases. 
The current structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence results in 
practical limitations on the appointment of a science consultant.  Under 
Federal Rule 706—the Court Appointed Expert Rule—the court may 
appoint an independent expert on motion of the court or the parties.232  This 
expert may be selected by the judge or by nominations of the parties, and 
will be paid by the parties “in such proportion and at such time as the court 
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.”233  While the 
expert serves the court, a Rule 706 expert under the current rule must 
advise the parties of his/her opinions, can be deposed by either party, and 
can be called to testify at trial.234 
                                                                                                                          
230 See discussion infra Part IV (offering a general discussion of reform efforts designed to 
remedy problems resulting from expert witnesses’ presentations of epidemiological evidence in court). 
231 The independent expert appointments should be limited to those cases that do not meet the 
qualifications for advanced science procedures.  See infra Parts IV.B.1.–2. 
232 FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
233 FED. R. EVID. 706(b).  See, e.g., Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304, 
1312 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing Rule 706(b)). 
234 FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
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Independent of the Court Appointed Expert Rule 706 powers, the court 
also has an inherent power to appoint experts to assist in the determination 
of preliminary issues of fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 104.  Under 
Rule 104, the judge must make initial determinations of whether evidence 
should be admissible for consideration by the jury, as an exercise of a 
parallel and more general power like Daubert gatekeeping under Rule 
702.235  Courts have used this power to appoint experts to evaluate 
complex science, avoiding the necessity of availability for trial testimony 
or deposition.236  In the Hall litigation regarding silicone gel breast 
implants and disease, the judge explicitly mentioned Rule 104 as an 
alternative to Rule 706, to “keep the advisors independent of any ongoing 
proceedings” and because Rule 706 requires the appointed experts “in 
effect, to act as additional witnesses subject to deposition and trial.”237 
Judges support the power to appoint experts, while remaining 
sometimes reluctant to actually do so, based on survey results in empirical 
research.238  In one important study, surveys were sent to 537 federal 
judges.239  These judges indicated overwhelmingly (87%) that court 
appointed experts are likely to be helpful in certain cases.240  A separate 
study also demonstrated that a high percentage of federal (76%) and state 
(70%) court judges approved of court appointed expert appointment.241 
However, independent experts do not appear to be appointed very 
often.  In the Cecil and Willging federal judicial poll, only twenty percent 
of judges had appointed an independent expert.242  While lack of cases 
requiring an independent expert was one reason for failure to appoint, 
judges surveyed indicated that their failure to use an expert related to 
respect for and adherence to the adversarial system.243 
As a response, and to encourage the use of court appointed 
independent experts, the Court Appointed Expert Rule should be rewritten 
to account for judicial reluctance to appoint independent scientific 
                                                                                                                          
235 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
236 See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.8 (D. Or. 1996) (utilizing 
Rule 104 rather than 706). 
237 Id. 
238 “Since passage in 1975, the rule has been little used, although authors often discuss its possible 
use.”  MORRIS H. DEGROOT ET AL., STATISTICS AND THE LAW 309 (1986). 
239 See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas S. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for 
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 n.33 (1994) (noting 
431 responses to a survey sent to 537 judges). 
240 Id. at 1008–09. 
241 Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and 
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 
731, 741 (1989). 
242 Cecil & Willging, supra note 239, at 1004. 
243 See id. at 1018–19 (noting that respect for the adversarial system is cited by judges as a 
rationale for not allowing expert testimony). 
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consultants.  Additional language would be added to Rule 706, as Rule 
706(e), allowing appointment of a court appointed science consultant, 
under the same payment terms of Rule 706(a) experts, for the use of the 
judge to evaluate and address specific scientific questions that arise from 
the dispute.244  With this change, the court would have an expert to assist 
the judge in addressing complicated scientific material under Daubert, with 
the proper background to do so, but without throwing a third expert into 
the presentation aspects of trial. 
The ability of a court to appoint a scientific consultant has several 
beneficial effects on complex litigation.  First, the appointment of a non-
deposable expert would reduce the main hindrance to judges in appointing 
scientific experts to assist them.  Second, it would allow a knowledgeable 
specialist to provide much-needed insight into scientific issues arising in 
complex litigation, overcoming the judicial scientific-and-statistical-
background weaknesses exposed by empirical studies.245  Third, the 
litigants’ experts, who may be chosen as a result of “outlier 
enhancement,”246 may recognize that their scientific opinions will be 
subject to third party review by the judge’s science consultant, and produce 
opinions with a more neutral, less partisan opinion.247  Fourth, the use of 
independent experts will offer reluctant but skilled scientists a chance to 
participate in legal cases involving their field.248  Finally, the use of 
scientific consultants will bring back to the courtroom a lost, or perhaps 
misplaced, part of scientific inquiry: the general state of knowledge in the 
field.249  By evaluating the general state of knowledge in the field, the court 
can understand and place the opinions of the litigants’ experts into 
perspective on the range of scientific opinion in the area.250 
Certain weaknesses of this proposal merit response.  Some critics 
                                                                                                                          
244 See Robert L. Hess II, Note, Judges Cooperating With Scientists: A Proposal for More 
Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge’s Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 547, 587 (2001) (suggesting a new Rule 707 to allow for separate technical advisors to serve as 
judicial experts). 
245 See discussion supra Parts III.A.–B. (discussing judges’ difficulty in understanding evidence 
presented in particularly complex litigation). 
246 See discussion supra Part III.D. (discussing outlier enhancement in the context of evaluation of 
complex science). 
247 See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1590–
91 (1995) (noting the general effect of reducing partisanship through independent consultant 
appointment). 
248 Hess, supra note 244, at 562–63.  Regarding the benefits of the one-time expert, see Jurs, 
supra note 101, at 80–81. 
249 Sanders, supra note 185, at 67.  Under Frye, the general acceptance test was the sole inquiry of 
scientific admissibility.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  Under Daubert, 
general acceptance became one of many considerations to evaluate in the reliability consideration, but 
is without question not necessary for admissibility.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 593–94 (1993). 
250 Bernstein, supra note 3, at 475. 
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allege that the potential bias of experts may be re-created with the 
appointment of a singular expert.251  In response, the science consultant 
would be available in some cases, but on the most technical and complex 
cases a panel of experts or a science court approach may be used, as 
discussed in the next section.252  In addition, the judge will ultimately 
maintain control of the situation, and should he be trained and sensitive to 
the issue,253 be able to narrow the inquiry so that the expert makes only 
scientific determinations rather than legal ones.  Finally, any judicial 
analysis of the science under Daubert will ultimately result in a judicial 
opinion, so the judge’s analysis of the issue will be available for review 
and, if necessary, appeal.  Collectively, these mechanisms should assure 
fairness to the parties. 
Other critics might suggest that since the ability of the parties to 
depose the expert has been removed, asking the litigants to pay the costs of 
expert appointment may no longer be permissible.254  Initially, one should 
note that Rules of Evidence are approved by an Act of Congress, so that 
the statutory basis would be clear.  If the court then requires the litigants to 
pay the costs, such costs are not a “taking” as the litigants should recognize 
the court’s need to properly and correctly evaluate complex science under 
Daubert.  As such, the costs are no different than other litigation costs, like 
stenography or copies, and do not fit within the narrow confines of judicial 
“takings” law.255  There appears to be no reason why these expert costs 
                                                                                                                          
251 This concern is mentioned in Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 364 (citing Ellen E. Deason, 
Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 
62 (1998)).  See also Bernstein, supra note 3, at 477; Sanders, supra note 185, at 69. 
252 See infra Part IV.B.; see also Sanders, supra note 185, at 69.  Note also that these approaches 
can be used in concert, as a judge could appoint a Rule 706 consultant to review appropriate scientific 
materials, but also await the results of a directly related Complex Science Litigation Panel or Court of 
Scientific Jurisdiction review before rendering a final decision.  This approach is reminiscent of Judge 
Jones in Hall, who issued a ruling following use of Rule 104 experts, but decided to defer the effective 
date of the opinion until the Science Panel from the Multi District Breast Implant case rendered a 
decision.  Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Or. 1996) (citing In re Silicone 
Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1996 WL 34401813, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. 
May 31, 1996)).  The decision in Hall was issued in December 1996, while the Panel issued its report 
on December 1, 1998.  Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant 
Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801, 810, 815 (2000); Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1387; In re Silicone 
Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1998 WL 35223618, at *1 (N.D. Ala. 
Dec. 16, 1998). 
253 See infra Part IV.C.2.  Note that in cases that follow a scientific panel opinion, the court’s 
analysis of the issue could be pared down to the essential elements unique to the new case before it.  
See infra Part IV.B.1. 
254 Under this proposal, costs would remain taxable to the parties, per Federal Rule of Evidence 
706(b). 
255 See Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, 
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 431–38 (2001) (discussing takings law as applied to the 
judiciary and whether the court should be “subject to the same takings restraints that apply to 
legislative regulation”). 
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could not be lawfully taxable to the parties. 
Permitting appointment of independent scientific consultants would 
overcome some of the weaknesses of the current Daubert regime.  It would 
allow scientific analysis back into the chambers of the courts, and provide 
for the wise exercise of Rule 702 Daubert discretion. 
B.  The Most Complex Cases Receive Advanced Science Procedures 
The benefit of singular, independent science consultants does have 
limitations.  For a subset of more complex cases, particularly those of first 
impression, an enhanced review process may be in order.  In such cases, 
the courts should have advanced methods for evaluating cutting-edge or 
complex science.  I propose two distinct alternative methods for advanced 
scientific analysis: creating case-level Complex Litigation Science Panels, 
or establishing a new Court of Scientific Jurisdiction. 
1.  Complex Litigation Science Panels 
The first alternative is to empower the courts to appoint a Complex 
Litigation Science Panel (“CLSP”) in certain “complex science cases” to 
thoroughly evaluate issues and create the best possible precedent for 
evaluation of issues by subsequent judges.  This Article therefore proposes 
a new rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 74, to meet these goals.256 
                                                                                                                          
256 Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74: 
Complex Litigation Science Panel 
a.  In cases designated under subsection (b), the District Court shall have the 
authority to appoint a Complex Litigation Science Panel, empowered to 
review the litigants’ expert disclosures and reports, if any, and issue a 
Scientific Panel Advisory Report pursuant to subsection (e). 
b.  Cases Included: a Complex Litigation Science Panel shall be permissible 
when the court finds any of the following: 
1.  Scientific or Technical Information is essential to assist the court in 
the determination of admissibility of evidence under FED. R. EVID. 702; 
2.  The science or technical information presented in the case has a high 
potential to be evaluated by other courts; or 
3.  A single science consultant may not provide the needed perspective 
on all the issues presented by the litigants. 
c.  Selection of Panelists: a Complex Litigation Science Panel shall consist of 
three members.  The Plaintiff or group of Plaintiffs shall select a single 
member, and the Defendants shall select a single member.  In the event a 
panelist cannot be selected, the court shall make a selection on behalf of that 
party.  Upon selection of each of the first two panelists, the panelists shall 
meet and select a third member, to serve as chair of the Panel. 
d.  Duty of Panel Members: Panel members must affirm, by oath or 
otherwise, that they will review the scientific material impartially and, to the 
best of their abilities, within the normal constraints of their particular 
scientific discipline. 
e.  Contents of Report: A Scientific Panel Advisory Report Shall include 
Analysis of: 
1.  Areas of Consensus between the Litigants’ Expert or Experts; 
2.  Areas of Disagreement between the Litigants Expert or Experts; 
a.  Those areas which the Panel Members Agree on How to 
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The threshold question in a case involving expert testimony is whether 
it is a case that will qualify for a CLSP under the rule, rather than the 
standard science consultant method from a modified Rule 706.  The 
proposed Rule 74 lists three separate considerations for appointment of a 
CLSP: (1) a determination of essential need by the judge; (2) high potential 
for evaluation in the future; or (3) the determination that a single scientific 
consultant would not be appropriate.257  While these may allow for use of 
the procedure in a wide variety of cases where the court finds a need, it is 
important to remember that use of science panels is limited since this 
procedure will take time and be expensive.  As a practical reality, then, the 
procedure may be limited to those cases that meet more than one of the 
three requirements. 
Next, the selection procedure for the science panel should be 
indisputably fair, in order to enhance legitimacy of its views.  In other 
areas of dispute resolution, a tripartite panel of arbitrators may address 
hotly contested issues and issue a final report.258  Each party to the dispute 
is able to appoint one arbitrator to the panel, and the two arbitrators then 
select the third member of the panel.259  This time-tested method of dispute 
                                                                                                                          
Resolve; 
b.  Those areas which the Panel Members Disagree on How to 
Resolve; and 
3.  Panelists Report on Areas of Disagreement Between Panelists; 
a.  Explanation of Competing Theories in the Area; 
b.  Scientific Basis of Each Competing Theory 
c.  Criticism of Each Theory by Adherents to the Opposing 
Theories. 
f.  Costs: all reasonable fees of the members of the Complex Litigation 
Science Panel shall be taxed to the parties as costs under FED. R. CIV. P. 
54(d). 
Commentators evaluating proposals for scientific review beyond a single independent expert under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 have used varied approaches to the legal basis of the panel.  Walker & 
Monahan, supra note 252, at 826 (proposing a science panel formed under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 53).  Due to the significance of the change from existing rules, this author suggests a new, 
separate rule, distinct from the prior existing framework. 
257 Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74, supra note 256; see also supra Part IV.A. (discussing the idea of 
a scientific consultant). 
258 See Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI L.J. 1203, 1225 (2005) (citing Int’l 
Olympic Comm., Court of Arbitration for Sport, Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of 
Sports-Related Disputes R41.1 (1984), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/281/ 
5048/0/3.1%20CodeEngnov2004.pdf) (discussing appointment process for arbitrators in disputes 
requiring panel of multiple arbitrators).  See also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., art. 1120, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (providing for submission of claims to arbitration under 
NAFTA). 
259 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1120, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
605.  In the Breast Implant Multi District Litigation, Judge Pointer used a separate method of selection 
involving a committee created to determine whom to choose.  Walker & Monahan, supra note 252, at 
808 (reviewing order issued by Judge Pointer, from In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1996 WL 34401813, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 1996)). 
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resolution would work well for selection of the CLSP as well. 
Finally, any CLSP must issue a “Scientific Panel Advisory Report” 
(“SPAR”) regarding the issue in dispute before the court.260  In reviewing 
the reports of the litigants’ experts, the SPAR should detail the areas of 
consensus between the litigants’ experts, and areas of disagreement 
between those experts.  For the areas of disagreement, the panel should 
report on which disagreements between the litigants’ experts the panelists 
are uniform in opinion, and on which the panelists disagree and why.  As 
for areas of disagreement among panelists, the panel should report the two 
or more major bodies of theory in the area, the scientific basis, and the 
criticism of each.  Finally, the report should provide recommendations to 
the judge for future analysis of similar areas or potential developments in 
the field.261  With each of these components, the SPAR informs the judge 
of areas that are not subject to disagreement, those that are, and why, so 
that the judge can use that information in his final application of the 
Daubert rules. 
The CLSP approach provides a series of benefits in complex litigation: 
the review of the parties’ expert reports by experts knowledgeable in the 
field, the fair selection process through an arbitration model, and the 
potential for a complex, detailed, and complete report (including minority 
views) on the issues in dispute.  Scientists would select the third panel 
member, so they would presumably be able to select someone whose 
scientific credentials and methodology are respected in the field.262  In 
addition, a tripartite panel overcomes the potential bias claims against an 
individually appointed scientific consultant, assuming that three scientists 
might have more diverse opinions than one lone expert.263  Finally, the 
SPAR report would provide enough detail for the judge to make a final and 
informed Daubert decision, and provide guidelines for other judges to 
review when faced with similar admissibility decisions.  Each of these 
considerations overcomes potential weaknesses in the Daubert system seen 
in the epidemiologic risk controversy.264 
As with the issue of individual science consultants under Rule 706, 
critics may attack the science panel approach by charging it is too costly or 
                                                                                                                          
260 The procedure described in this paragraph comes from Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74(e), supra 
note 256. 
261 The recommendations for judicial review assist the judge in the initial case with the Daubert 
findings, but are extremely helpful to future judges in analyzing similar but not identical scientific 
information. 
262 This overcomes a concern of judges that they are unable to find a suitable expert.  Cecil & 
Willging, supra note 239, at 1022. 
263 See discussion supra Part IV.A. (addressing criticism that a singular court appointed expert 
might taint the process with his own individual bias). 
264 See discussion supra Part III (discussing flaws in the Daubert regime when applied to 
epidemiologic risk cases).  
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inefficient.  On the issue of cost, a three-expert panel will certainly entail 
significant expenditure.  However, this expense can be mitigated to some 
degree by the expertise and experience of the selected scientists.  With 
their collective knowledge base, they should be able to easily and 
efficiently identify and address pertinent issues.  Cost may also be 
mitigated by the involvement of appropriate professional societies to 
provide services within this panel system.265  Another consideration is that 
the cost, while initially high, should be measured against the value of 
keeping the courthouse door open to valid claims which otherwise might 
be shut out, and the cost of “getting it right” the first time in the report 
issued by the panel.  Had the Daubert II court been more discerning in its 
review of the epidemiology in that case, by either using a more detailed 
scientific basis for the opinion, or by reconsidering the scientists portrayal 
of the doubling of the risk standard as poor science, many other errors in 
similar cases relying on Daubert II might have been avoided.266 
For the most complex and detailed cases, and for cases of first 
impression in scientific fields, a science panel approach based on 
arbitration principles would overcome some of the weaknesses of the 
current Daubert regime.  It would allow for the wise exercise of Rule 702 
judicial discretion, provide detailed insight for further court opinions, and 
use the knowledge of specialists in the field for the benefit of the judicial 
process. 
2.  Court of Scientific Jurisdiction 
A specialized Court of Scientific Jurisdiction (“CSJ”) provides an 
alternative to the science panel approach.  The idea of a science court 
handling specialized cases dates to the 1960s, and was largely debated in 
the 1970s and 1980s.267  Proposals from this era varied from scientific 
                                                                                                                          
265 Some scientists champion the need for greater interaction among professional societies and 
lawyers within complex science.  Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 31.  On the issue of the National 
Academy of Sciences weighing in on a controversy before courts, see Walker & Monahan, supra note 
252, at 812–13. 
266 See supra Parts II.B.–D. (reviewing the caselaw in the wake of Daubert II).  Walker & 
Monahan, evaluating their proposal of using a Rule 53 independent panel, have noted that “the greatest 
benefits in terms of efficiency and justice would occur in collateral or other cases involving the same 
question of general causation.  In this situation, the scientific authority model permits the use of 
doctrines of precedence to reduce redundancy and encourage courts to decide similar cases similarly.”  
Walker & Monahan, supra note 252, at 830. 
267 See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 817, 817–18 (1977) (discussing the role of courts in evaluating and deciding complex issues of 
science and technology); Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of 
Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 470–71 (1988) 
(considering a “regulatory apparatus” to resolve “hazardous-substance-induced injury claims” as an 
alternative to tort actions); Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 332, 
332 (1977) (reporting on the “feasibility of a series of experiments to help define the promise and 
problems of the Science Court approach for providing factual basis for policy-making”); Arthur 
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advisory panels to appellate panel structures, subject-specific to general in 
scope.268  While the subject generated much commentary many years ago, 
science court proposals and analysis lessened during the shift from the 
Frye to the Daubert regime of evidentiary review.  However, now with 
over fifteen years of Daubert review to analyze, and with the Daubert 
system revealing weaknesses in complex scientific review,269 the idea of a 
science court should be reconsidered. 
A centralized CSJ could manage a science docket consisting of an 
enumerated class of certified complex science cases delegated to it from 
the general federal courts.270  Congress would have to pass enabling 
legislation to create the CSJ as an Article III court, and when doing so 
Congress should authorize permanent placement of the CSJ in the national 
capital.271  Two questions regarding the CSJ then immediately arise: what 
cases will qualify to be heard within the CSJ, and what will be the structure 
of the court.  By answering these, the benefits of a CSJ become apparent. 
For a federal court to have jurisdiction at all, Congress must maintain 
minimal diversity requirements.272  With minimal diversity jurisdiction 
satisfied, the substantive jurisdiction of the court would then include the 
same class of complex, cutting-edge, and likely-to-be-addressed-again set 
of cases that the CLSP would have under Proposed Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 74.273  Under that rule, and for the CSJ, the science docket 
includes three separate considerations: a determination of essential need by 
the initial generalist judge, high potential for re-evaluation in the future, or 
the determination that a single scientific consultant under Rule 706 would 
                                                                                                                          
Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCI. 763, 763 (1967) (concerning 
the “institutionaliz[ation] [of] the scientific advisory function” of the science community and 
recommendations to increase the “presumptive validity of the scientific input”); William V. Luneburg 
& Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for 
Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 888 (1981) (discussing 
use of “‘special’ juries and expert nonjury tribunals” for “complex federal civil cases”); James A. 
Martin, The Proposed ‘Science Court,’ 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058, 1058 (1977) (evaluating “the 
desirability of establishing some kind of science court”); Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific 
Evidence, supra note 247, at 1603–05 (proposing the “establishment of a special court presided over by 
expert judges” to hear “complex and scientific cases”). 
268 Compare, e.g., Brennan, supra note 267, at 523 (discussing hazardous substance panel 
proposal), with Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 267, at 995–99 (proposing generalized structure 
for all complex disputes). 
269 See discussion supra Part III. 
270 The class of cases qualifying for adjudication by the Court of Scientific Jurisdiction would be 
the same class of certified complex cases listed in Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 74(b), supra note 256. 
271 Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 247, at 1604 (recognizing 
that any science court proposal requires Congressional authorization under Article III of the 
Constitution). 
272 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2009) (setting minimal diversity jurisdiction limit for class action 
suits, created by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)).  The 
CSJ would require a similar minimal diversity for jurisdictional purposes. 
273 See supra note 256. 
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not be appropriate.274  Under the enabling act, the CSJ would have original 
jurisdiction over cases meeting the substantive standard for the CSJ, and 
also could accept cases re-assigned to it by general federal courts when the 
judge makes a finding of need for reassignment. 
Second, the structure of the CSJ would be fundamentally different than 
a typical, generalist district courthouse.  Judges assigned to the CSJ would 
be Article III judges, but since their docket would contain mainly complex 
science, they must be selected for judicial worthiness with some 
consideration of scientific background or skill.  The enabling act need not 
explicitly mandate a certain level of scientific or mathematical training, but 
as a practical matter an advanced degree should be a prerequisite.  Judges 
could also come from a variety of disciplines, so that overall a wide variety 
of skills come together under the one roof of the CSJ. 
In addition to scientifically skilled judges, the CSJ could, as the 
centralized court in the field, regularly appoint “science clerks” in addition 
to the legal clerks a federal court normally appoints.  Science clerks would 
permit the judges to further evaluate and refine science testimony and 
issues, particularly if outside the particular discipline of the judge.275  If 
judges can appoint clerks to assist them in making legal findings, a science 
clerk to assist in making science findings under Daubert seems appropriate 
as well. 
Besides the staffing on the bench and in chambers, the CSJ would 
operate under the identical Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
as a standard federal court.  As a result, the CSJ judges would continue to 
make Daubert rulings on litigants’ expert testimony, hold trials, and draft 
written rulings.  In these rulings, the CSJ judges could offer an advanced 
level of detail in scientific areas, separating the legal and scientific bases of 
the opinions, to provide other judges with non-CSJ cases more guidelines 
to use in their work.  On appeal, the CSJ cases should be appealable to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.276  Not unlike patent 
litigation, the Federal Circuit could become an appellate court familiar 
with the special intricacies of the CSJ, and it would become better able to 
                                                                                                                          
274 Id.  See also supra Part IV.A. (recommending use of scientific consultant).  The Independent 
Expert from Rule 706 would therefore remain the default method to deal with complex cases, and 
solely those cases meeting these advanced criteria merit the use of the science panel/science court 
approach.  See supra note 231; see also supra text accompanying note 252; Sanders, supra note 185, at 
81. 
275 The “clerk as advisor” approach has been tried famously in a notable case, when Judge 
Wyzanski appointed an economist, Carl Kaysen, to serve as his clerk during the time of a major 
antitrust case.  United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).  For 
analysis of United Shoe and the law clerk analogy, see Deason, supra note 251, at 138–40. 
276 See LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through 
Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 92 
(2002); see also Hess, supra note 244, at 554; Luneberg & Nordenberg, supra note 267, at 930–31. 
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handle CSJ appeals over time.277 
The CSJ proposal offers significant benefits over the current structure 
of generalist judges handling science cases.  The consideration of scientific 
literacy in the appointment of Article III judges for the CSJ would 
overcome the empirical research finding of generalist judges’ significant 
weaknesses in handling complex science and statistics.278  Judges with 
scientific training would not have this Achilles’ heel. 
Second, the CSJ proposal brings science back into the judicial process 
again, in a way not seen since the abrogation of Frye.279  With judges who 
have been trained in scientific fields, science knowledge and the “general 
state of scientific knowledge” re-enters the courtroom, not through the 
litigants’ experts, but through the judge.280 
An additional benefit comes from the location of the CSJ in the 
national capital.  Since the court would be in Washington, D.C., the CSJ 
could call upon national bodies of scientific research, such as the National 
Academies of Sciences, National Science Foundation, or the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, should the need for court-
appointed experts arise.281  This offers the benefit of a large number of 
well-trained technicians, unmatched in diversity of fields, within the same 
city as the CSJ, and is a benefit unique to this location in the United States. 
Finally, the CSJ proposal, as a court of special jurisdiction, is a 
specialized structure that has proven to be valuable in other areas of 
complex litigation such as business disputes.  In the most well-known 
example, the Delaware Court of Chancery has been adjudicating complex 
business disputes since 1792.282  In handling complex business litigation, 
                                                                                                                          
277 See Kondo, supra note 276, at 92 (discussing the use of specialized judges at the Federal 
Circuit level); Hess, supra note 244, at 554 (analogizing specialist judges of a science court with 
Federal Circuit judges).  On the general question of familiarity resulting in judicial accuracy, see 
Sanders, supra note 185, at 82. 
278 See supra Parts III.A.–B. 
279 See supra note 249 (discussing how the general acceptance test of Frye was relegated to only 
one consideration in the Daubert system). 
280 Id.  This also occurs, to a lesser extent, with the science clerks. 
281 The National Academies of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the National 
Research Council, and the Institute of Medicine are headquartered in Washington, D.C., as is the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science.  The National Science Foundation is across the 
Potomac in Arlington, VA.  See The National Academies: Advisors to the Nation on Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine, http://www.nationalacademies.org/ (last visited July 17, 2009); The 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, http://www.aaas.org/ (last visited July 17, 
2009); The National Science Foundation, http://www.nsf.gov/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).  See supra 
Part IV.A. (suggesting court-appointed experts).  For a discussion of the benefit of the scholarly 
societies in the Washington area, see Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 364; Greenland, Critical 
Appraisal, supra note 2, at 308; Rodricks & Rieth, supra note 50, at 31. 
282 See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery—1792–1992, in BICENTENNIAL COMMEMORATION COMMITTEE, COURT OF CHANCERY OF 
THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792–1992 (1992), reprinted in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1993). 
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the court has “earned a worldwide reputation for fairness, experience, and 
expertise in presiding over corporate disputes.”283  Based on this 
reputation, the court attracts litigants from around the United States 
interested in a specialized and fair process of adjudication for their 
complex disputes.284  Due to the success of the Delaware model, other 
states have authorized business or complex commercial courts with similar 
models.285  In the context of complex commercial litigation, litigants see 
the benefits of a specialized docket and court with specialized 
knowledge.286  The same should be true for complex science. 
Critics of the science court of specialized jurisdiction may attack the 
CSJ proposal on several grounds.  Initially, there is a question whether the 
court could proceed with jury trials, since the guarantee of a jury trial often 
involves a cross-sectional jury from the location of the court.287  It is first 
helpful to note that juries need not be selected from the location of the 
dispute, but may constitutionally be selected from a district in which there 
could have been jurisdiction, after transfer of venue,288 or from another 
unrelated district as in a case of media bias.289  Unless the CSJ used a jury 
pool selection procedure that impedes on equal protection rights, jury 
fairness would be preserved by the proposed structure.290  As long as the 
enabling statute of the science court grants it jurisdiction over any case 
meeting the substantive terms of jurisdiction, then the court would be an 
appropriate location for any complex dispute.291 
A second criticism of the proposal could include the argument that any 
proposal with nonrandom assignment of judges is bad policy and subject to 
abuse.292  In response, it is important to first examine the sources of a 
                                                                                                                          
283 Donald F. Parsons, Jr., & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware’s Business Courts: 
Their Rise to Preeminence, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 21. 
284 Id. at 25. 
285 See Lee Applebaum, The “New” Business Courts: Responding to Modern Business and 
Commercial Disputes, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 13, 14–17 (discussing establishment of 
business courts in Florida, Maine, North Carolina, South Carolina, and others); Mnookin, supra note 
185, at 1031 (discussing increased use of business/complex civil litigation court model). 
286 Specialized decisionmakers are unquestioned in the context of patent and bankruptcy 
litigation.  See 35 U.S.C. §101 et seq. (2006) (patent statute); 28 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (2006) 
(bankruptcy court designation). 
287 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006). 
288 Id. § 1404(a). 
289 Id. § 1404(b). 
290 Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 267, at 923–25. 
291 Jurisdiction for the CSJ would be based on a particular jurisdictional statute, for example, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (1996), creating jurisdiction to that court for all cases which could be brought in federal 
court elsewhere but, due to their subject matter, belong at the CSJ.  For another example, see the 
bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1996).  See supra text accompanying note 271 
(noting Congress would need to create CSJ as an Article III court). 
292 See, e.g., David J. Damiani, Comment, Proposals for Reform in the Evaluation of Expert 
Testimony in Pharmaceutical Mass Tort Cases, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 517, 542–45 (2003) 
(discussing neutrality and undue influence concerns in specialized science courts). 
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potential randomness requirement.  While Congress has seen bills 
requiring random assignment of judges, those proposals have not been 
passed into law.293  Under the current United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 137, 
the chief judge of the district court is responsible for the observance of 
assignment rules adopted by the district judges.294  This statute does not 
mandate random assignment,295 and so far the case law regarding a 
constitutional right to random assignment has been “generally hostile to the 
approach and undertake[n] little thoughtful analysis.”296  Randomness is 
often a result of local rules within the circuit, but often the rules are 
deemed “‘housekeeping’ measures” or are not enforced.297  Since there is 
no “right” to random assignment, the courts have not enforced random 
assignment as an obligation on the judicial selection of cases.298  As a 
result, the assignment of a controversy to the CSJ would not infringe upon 
a protected right of a litigant. 
Even if not a “right,” courts often mention that the selection of the 
judge or courtroom should not be arbitrary, based on improper grounds, or 
create an appearance of impropriety.299  None of these concerns are raised 
by the CSJ.  Because the court is created to handle a certain class of cases, 
and structured to better handle them, a reassignment is not arbitrary or 
without cause.  Nor is a reassignment based on improper grounds; rather, it 
reflects the judgment of Congress, in enacting the CSJ enabling act, that 
well-trained specialists with technical backgrounds can better handle 
disputes involving complex or cutting-edge scientific evidence.  Finally, as 
to the appearance of impropriety, the CSJ enhances rather than diminishes 
the fairness to the parties, allowing for fair, impartial adjudication of the 
dispute, within the framework of a court better able to handle the 
dispute.300  That structure is more appropriate and addresses the 
weaknesses exposed within the current system. 
For the subset of the most complex, detailed, and first-impression 
cases in scientific fields, a court of special jurisdiction for science would 
provide an institutionalized alternative to the science panel approach.301  
The court would allow dispute resolution in a specialized setting, proven to 
                                                                                                                          
293 See Blind Justice Act of 1999, S. 1484, 106th Cong. (1999) (referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary) (proposing random assignment of judges except in related cases and technical cases). 
294 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2006). 
295 See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of 
Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1090 (2000) (discussing the absence of statutory authority prescribing 
neutral assignment of federal judges). 
296 Id. at 1099. 
297 Id. at 1096 (citations omitted). 
298 Id. at 1096–99 (citing In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
299 Id. at 1098, 1101–02 (citations omitted). 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 282–84 (discussing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
reputation for fairness in adjudicating complex business disputes). 
301 See supra Part IV.B.1. (describing Complex Litigation Science Panels). 
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be effective in the complex business litigation context.  It also has the 
added benefit of proximity to the major organizations of scientific 
advancement in the U.S.  By sending the most complex science cases to 
the CSJ, the court system could overcome weaknesses of the current 
Daubert regime, allowing for the wise exercise of Rule 702 discretion 
within the Daubert framework. 
C.  Discrete Points of Modification 
Independent of the structural reform for scientific evidence questions, 
discussed in Parts IV.A.–B., several smaller modifications could also 
enhance the judicial accuracy and efficiency in handling complex or 
cutting-edge science. 
1.  Allow Modifications to Expert Opinion to Account for New Science, 
as “Good Cause” Under Rule 16 
In Daubert evaluations, the Supreme Court commands that scientists 
bring the same rigor of their discipline to the courtroom as from the 
laboratory.302  Under the current formulation of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16, this may not be possible. 
The basic scientific method, and epidemiologic science in particular, 
mandates the continued evaluation of new data in formulation and testing 
of conclusions.303  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, however, the 
case management order mandates a single disclosure of data and opinions 
from experts.304  Any new information after that date cannot be used as a 
basis for an opinion of an expert, unless the court grants an amendment to 
the case management order for “good cause.”305 
In order to ensure that scientists may continue to assimilate data, or at 
least take into account new data or studies postdating the initial disclosure, 
a Rule 16 determination of “good cause” should include language allowing 
modifications of experts’ opinions based on the scientific method.  
Whether by committee note, or by including a specific caveat within the 
language of Rule 16(b)(4), litigants should be granted leave to amend the 
scheduling order for good cause to allow for additional scientific opinion 
based on new data postdating the initial disclosures. 
The proposal to allow modification of a scheduling order for scientific 
good cause has several benefits.  First, it returns the rigor of the laboratory 
to the courtroom, as Daubert commands.306  In addition, it allows for the 
court to correct, before it is enshrined in precedent, a scientific 
                                                                                                                          
302 Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
303 See supra Part III.E.2. (noting how the discovery process may impede this goal). 
304 See supra text accompanying notes 221–23. 
305 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4); see supra text accompanying note 223. 
306 See supra notes 229, 302, and accompanying text. 
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misconception that has already been shown to be without scientific basis.  
In doing so, it prevents what has been deemed “judicial junk” by 
prominent commentators in the field of epidemiology.307  “Judicial junk” 
has a tendency to mislead future courts,308 so correcting known errors early 
in the process is worth the time and expense necessary to modify the 
disclosed expert opinions.  Otherwise, the ability to re-examine the 
scientific content will be lost as appellate decisions focus on the legal rules 
under the appropriate standard of review.309 
Critics of this proposal may state that it is impractical in application, 
allowing late endorsement of experts by lazy litigants who erroneously 
endorsed the expert at the first disclosure.  Some litigants may see this as 
an opportunity to try to “game” the system, play hide the ball, or whatever 
metaphor applies to disingenuous litigation tactics.  Judges should be 
aware of this as a possibility, using the “good cause” rule on science only 
for those cases when the new data or studies truly postdate the initial 
disclosures.  We trust judges to make these determinations in normal Rule 
16(b)(4) motions to modify a scheduling order, and we should trust that 
judges will be able to make determinations on the issue of scientific 
changes as well. 
2.  Focus of Judicial Training 
Another method to increase the judicial accuracy, efficiency, and 
consistency of scientific evidence under Daubert is to increase the 
opportunity for judicial training in the general theories, methodologies, and 
practice of scientific research. 
Empirical research demonstrates that judges lack fundamental 
knowledge in basic science concepts and statistics.310  In addition, when 
asked about the number of classes in science or math in their educational 
background, judges scored below a subset of the jury pool consisting of 
college graduates.311  As a result, judges as a class of professionals lack 
some of the essential skills needed to handle the Daubert analysis.  One 
approach to dealing with this issue is to bring science into chambers, by 
either appointment of independent experts or use of science panels or a 
science court.312 
However, for some scientific principles the reform need not advance 
that far.  Judges can be, and are, trained at conferences, workshops, or 
                                                                                                                          
307 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 348–49. 
308 Id. at 348, 353. 
309 Daubert decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion standard.  G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
141 (1997). 
310 See discussion supra Parts III.A.–B. (discussing judicial weakness in these areas). 
311 See supra text accompanying note 132. 
312 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.–B. (detailing proposed science panel or science court). 
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other events held by scientists.313  While there may be a potential for 
conflicts of interest in the sponsorship of these training sessions,314 
workshops and conferences appear to be utilized by judges in their training 
in science or statistics.315 
An important consideration, even in light of this use of CLE and 
workshops in specific areas of science, is that empirical evidence shows 
judges overwhelmingly (ninety-six percent) have not received training in 
general scientific principles.316  As a result, the training in the specific 
areas may well be too complex, or too subject specific, to be of use in the 
wide variety of cases before a court of general jurisdiction. 
In response, the respected bodies of scientists should tailor some of 
their continuing education goals to filling the unmet need in general 
methodologies and procedures of scientific research.  As a result, judges 
can be trained to be critical of proposed expert testimony, better able to 
know the assumptions contained within research, and less dependent on the 
opposing expert to point out weaknesses in an opinion by a litigant’s 
expert.317 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Daubert system for judicial screening of expert evidence for 
relevance and reliability assumed judges would be able to analyze, 
critically evaluate, and make value judgments about the relative worth of 
highly complex, cutting-edge science. 
Following Daubert, courts faced difficulty with these determinations 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  In a series of cases following 
Daubert, courts faced the challenge of complex epidemiologic risk 
evidence.  While inconsistently handling the epidemiologic risk evidence 
under Daubert, the judicial handling of this complex field of science 
exposed other weaknesses of the Daubert system. 
Weaknesses of the Daubert regime include judicial knowledge and 
background with fundamental scientific principles, judicial ability to 
handle complex statistical information, overuse of bright-line tests that 
                                                                                                                          
313 Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, at 370; see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 200 (1999) 
(explaining the training programs of the Federal Judicial Center, National Judicial College, and Private 
Adjudication Center, to teach judges science and statistics). 
314 Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 309.  This is not a reason to fail to have training 
sessions, but rather emphasizes the need for content-neutral, non-conflicted sponsorship by 
organizations such as the Federal Judicial Center or National Judicial College.  See FAIGMAN, supra 
note 313, at 200. 
315 See Gatowski et al., supra note 123, at 442 (finding that sixty-three percent of judges surveyed 
reported having attended a CLE class about specific scientific evidence). 
316 Id. 
317 Id. at 455; Greenland, Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 309; Beyea & Berger, supra note 1, 
at 370. 
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may lack scientific validity, the use of litigation experts who may not 
represent the general state of knowledge in the field, and the 
incompatibility of the judicial procedure with measured evaluation of 
complex scientific principles.  Each identified issue presents a reason why 
a judge may inconsistently or inaccurately evaluate the most difficult 
scientific principles. 
Identifying weaknesses with the Daubert review, however, allows us 
to work to fix the problems by modifying the current system.  One way to 
bring more science back into the courthouse, or to judges’ chambers, is to 
permit the appointment of a science consultant under a modified Federal 
Rule of Evidence 706.  For an even smaller subset of cases, more radical 
reform is appropriate.  In those cases, use of a science panel constituted 
under a modified arbitration panel format would create a formalized 
process for review.  In the alternative, a Court of Scientific Jurisdiction 
offers significant advantages to the process, and has met with great success 
in the complex business litigation context.  Finally, other smaller reforms, 
such as refocusing continuing education efforts and the expansion of “good 
cause” to include the development of knowledge in the field, plug holes in 
the Daubert system exposed by the epidemiologic risk controversy.  
By critically examining the breakdown of Daubert in the face of 
epidemiologic risk evidence, evaluating the nature of the weaknesses in the 
system, and initiating changes structured to respond to those reforms, we 
can modify the current Daubert system to allow judges to more 
consistently, accurately, and efficiently handle the most complex cutting-
edge science presented in the courtroom. 
